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FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE WESTERN APACHES
1848-1886
By RALPH H. OGLE
CHAPTER V
THE CONTEST BETWEEN THE CIVIL AND THE MILITARY
AUTHORITIES
HE PEACE made at Camp Verde did not solve the problem of Apache control. Its consummation merely indicated that the military power had cleared the way for the
work of civilization. Moreover, the cessation of fighting
meant that, if events were allowed to come to a logical end,
the military would eventually be unnecessary and the management of the Apaches would become strictly a function of
the civil government~
General Crook undoubtedly envisaged such a future, but
he did not minimize the work or the time that would be
required to produce such a result. However, the general was
so sure the war was "virtually at an end," at the time of the
peace, that he immediately promulgated instructions designed to aid in the development of civil government. To
retain and strengthen his control over the surrendered
Indians, a small number of his former scouts were to be
selected from the various tribes to constitute the police force
of the reservation. They were to conform to regular discipline, but in order that they might "serve as a nucleus for
the establishment of civil government," they were to be
"required to cultivate the soil and perform the various industries prescribed by the Indian Department, the same as other
Indians."1
The commanding officers were to aid the "agents in
instructing the Indians in civil government in its simplest
form," so that the latter could gradually learn "its benefits

T

1. Crook to A. A. G., April 12, 1873, A. G. 0., 1882; Crook to A. G., Sept. 22,
1878, I. 0., I 355; Gen. Orders no. 13, April 8, 1873, Army War College. In the case
of the Office of Indian Affairs, the names Indian Office, Indian Bureau, Indian Department, Indian Service and Bureau were used by officials in their reports. These names
will henceforth appear variously and will be cited as I. O.
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as contrasted with their own barbarousforms'and customs."
The instruction was also to be gradually enlarged, with the
hope that the savages would eventually become good citizens
"capable of self-government." They were to be treated mildly
except for offenses of serious import, but always as "children in ignorance, not in innocence." Even more important,
the general earnestly enjoined the civil and military officers
to have "perfect harmony. in their official relations, and
directed them not to take action on any disputed question
until he had issued instructions. 2
But perfect harmony was very improbable as long as
Crook continued to reiterate his confidence in General Orders
no. 10 and their enforcement as a strict requirement. 3 A
portent of approaching conflict was further indicated by the
inspector general's recommendation that when the departments "do not work together the Indian Department mllst
succumb to the military to insure peace and prevent bloodshed." 4 Yet most of the field officers, both civil and military,
agreed that all promises made to the Indians should be faithfully ~ept, and that liberal financial outlays should be provided for their wards' maintenance. 5
Indian administration itself was sharply reorganized
just before Crook concluded his first campaign against the
Apaches. Early in February, 1873, congress, through the
efforts of Representative J amesA. Garfield, abolished several superintendencies, including that of Arizona. This
action was taken to simplify Indian management and to
increase and facilitate the efficiency of the respective
agencies. Each agency was to purchase its own supplies
and report directly to the Indian Office. To insure against
laxity on the part of the agents and to guarantee expert ad2. Ibid.
3. Crook to A. G., Sept. 22, 1873, op. cit.
4. Col. D. B. Sacket to A. A. G., July 1, 1873, A. G. 0., 3074. Schofield involved
himself with Secretary Delano by charging that the Modoc troubleS were caused
through the interference of the Oregon superintendent. Schofield to Hdqrs. of Army
May 5, 1873, A. G. 0., 1882; Walker to T. B. Odeneal, April 12, July '6, 1873, A. G. 0.,
2669.
5. Bendell to Walker, Jan. 14, 1873, I. 0., B 594; Crook to A. G., Sept. 22, 1873.
op. cit.; 42 Cong.• 3 sess., H. E. D. no. 105 Arizona Citizen, June 28,. 1873.
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vice, the president was empowered to appoint five Indian inspectors; who were authorized to visit and examine each
agency at least twice each year. They were to be held strictly
responsible to the secretary of the interior. 6
The building of a telegraph line to the Apache country
also worked a profound transformation in the administration of both the military and civil affairs. McCormick, with
the support of Garfield and Belknap, seized an opportunity to
amend the sundry civil appropriation bill on January 21,
1873, to include $50,000 for the construction of a line from
California to Arizona. The work started at San Diego on
August 23, and with a branch to Fort Whipple was completed at Tucson in slightly more than three months' time. 7
Thus, with instantaneous communication from Washington,
instead of a delay of twenty days when dependence had to be
placed on the telegraphic termini at Santa Fe and San Diego,
sufficient economies were effected in the letting of contracts
and in increasing the effectiveness of scouting parties, to pay
for the line in less than a year. 8
But the real problems of Apache control had to be met
at the reservations. These problems were to be solved, according to the "Peace Plan," by Christian civilian agents
nominated by the Dutch Reformed Church. Should their
peaceful methods fail, the military was to step in to
enforce obedience; and in the case of a complete breakdown
.of authority, an army officer was temporarily to assume the
duties of the agent. Naturally, a condition of chaos was to
6. Arizona Citizen, Mar. 22, June 21, 1873; Laws and Instructions Relating to the
Duties of Inspectors of the United States Indian Service (Washington. 1885), pp. 8.4.
Bendel! resigned on March 26, but stayed at his post until relieved by J. A. Tonner
on June 3. The superintendency ended on June 80, 1873. Comm. to Bendel!, Mar. 26,
1878, L. B. no. 112, p. 27. Dr. Bendel! returned to Albany, New York, where he
resumed his profession of medicine. He died November 14, 1932, at the age of 89.
New York Times, Nov. 15, 1932.
7. Arizona Citizen, April 12, Sept. 13, Dec. 6, 1873.
The first telegram over the line was sent by General Schofield, on October 29,
congratulating Crook upon his promotion to brigadier general. This promotion was
made by President Gran~ over the heads of thirty-four senior officers. Ibid., Nov. 15,
22, 1873.
8. 43 Cong.• 2 sess., H. E. D. no. I, vol. ii, p. 4.
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exist most of the time, with such a fertile field for the dElVel..:
opment of jealousies and personal animosities. 9
The church was handicapped from the start, due to the
few frontiersmen among her converts. The church officials
fully agreed with Governor Safford that an agent's religious
views had little to do with his ability to manage savage and
erratic Indians, but the officials also knew that their organization would be held accountable for their appointees' moral
conduct. They were therefore compelled to appoint eastern
men whose reputations were fully established. The church
was further handicapped because of the difficulties her
agents encountered in finding the right kind of employees,
especially at the low wages paid. 10
Regardless of difficulties, the problem of Apache management after the surrender at Camp Verde was essentially a
concern of the civilian agents. But almost all that could be
attempted at first was to ration the Indians and impose·mild
restraints upon them, designed to check their propensities
for roving. The Campe Verde Reservation presented an
especially difficult problem. The Indians had never craved
this region for a permanent home arid during the period of
hostilities none had remained there on their own accord. In
fact, when over one thousand came in at the time peace was
made, they did so because of sheer exhaustion. Fevers and
dietary troubles soon carried away more than three hundred
individuals; then the toll was greatly increased by whoopingcough and eye diseases. Sedentary life induced unsanitary
conditions, which, in turn, were made.worse by the Indians'
meager knowledge of cooking. With no medicines available,
9. The arrogance of the military was not lessened by Sherman's statement that
nearly all the civilizing and Christianizing of the Indians had been done under army
supervision. Arizona Citizen, May 10, 1873.
10. Safford to editor, Nov. 30, 1872, Arizona Citiz...., Dec. 7, 1872; R. B. 1. C.,
1870, p. 111, 1873. p. 126.
Superintendent L. E. Dudley, of New Mexico, in suggesting that the churches
should consider other traits besides piety, wrote that a "competent bad. man will in
the long run cost the Government less than an incompetent good man," Dudley to
Smith, Nov. 15, 1873, 43 Cong., 1 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. iv, p. 638.
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except the little furnished by the military, the condition of
the savages grew rapidly worse.H
There was a great fluctuation in numbers during the
summer and fall of 1873. Certain renegades and several
straggling parties stayed in the mountains at the time of the
surrender, hoping to remain unnoticed, but numerous punitive expeditions during the following weeks forced them to
give up. And in May the number was further increased by
the addition of about five hundred Indians from Date
Creek. 12 This change endangered the already weak control
of the reserve, for the presence of many new squaws caused
much violence among the warriors. However, Agent Williams, now returned from Date Creek, diplomatically displaced the old chiefs with young men who could enforce
order. A better attitude was also induced, in August, when
the military forced' certain settlers to pay damages done to
the Indians' fields by roving stock. 13
All the field officials from the time of Colyer's visit
considered the Verde Reservation to be a permanent home
for the savages, and Agent Williams, who appears to have
had the Indians' welfare at heart, eagerly looked forward to
the inauguration of the methods of civilization. Unfortun11. !T. W. Williams to Bendell, April 28, 1873, 1. 0., Ariz. Misc.; Dr. L. Sanderson
to Smith, June 29, 1874, ibid.
When 1500 tribesmen became ill at one time, Crook's prompt action in increasing
the strength of the Verde post prevented a general hegira. Thus frustrated, and
egged on by jealous medicine men, the bands killed a number of "witches." Dr. W. H.
Corbusier, m8., B. E., PP. 13-16.
12. Although Agent Williams had no trouble at the Camp Date Creek agency
during the winter and spring of 1872-1873, Crook and Bendell decided in the following
April, 1873, that the bands while still cowed by the recent campaigns should be moved to
the Verde Reserve. The removal was made on May 1, unfortunately too late to plant
crops in the Verde Valley. Four hundred and twenty-five Indians were taken to the
Verde Reservation at the time, but despite the fact that Crook posted a strong force
of troops around Camp Date Creek two hundred and forty-four others escaped to the
mountains. The troops then pushed them to the Colorado Reserve, and later, on
June 18, Crook ordered 'their transference to the Verde Reservation. By September,
the Apache question in western Arizona had ceased to exist. Williams to BendeIl,
Feb. 24, 1873, I. 0., Ariz. Misc.; Crook to Bendell, April 9, 1873, I. 0., B 145; Bendell
to Comm., April 9, 1873, S. L. B., vol. ii, p. 202; Crook to A. G., Sept. 22, 1873, 1. 0.,
I 355.
13. A. G. Buttner to BendeIl, April 14, 1873, 1. 0., Ariz. Misc.; Lt. W·. S. Schuyler to A. A. G., Sept. I, 1873, A. G. 0., 5228.
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ately, his initial plans which were largely agricultural failed
due to the late date of the peace in April, 1873 (too late to
plant crops) and to the still later' removal of the Date Creek
Indians. Tools were not made available because of bureaucratic slowness, and the meager cultivation undertaken was
done with those implements lent by the military. He moved
his charges from near the post to a healthful region eighteen
miles away, where he expected to build an agency; but with
no funds available he found little work to do except to make
plans for the next year. 14
' .
Williams planned an irrigation ditch ten miles long that
would irrigate 2,000 acres. Such an area of cultivated land
to supplement the excellent grazing land of the reserve
caused him to contemplate the Indians as transformed into
peaceful farmers. Surprised to find that the Apaches were
not averse to labor, he asked for an advance of $5,000, to begin the canal so that the crops could be planted early in 1874.
But he was soon even more surprised, for his request was
refused upon the ground that the Indian Office had under
consideration a proposal to remove the Verde Indians to the
San Carlos Reservation. 15
Thus, unable to make fundamental plans, Dr. Williams
gave his attention to the Indians' health and comfort; and he
succeeded in winning the bands' confidence to a' high degree.
They improved their cooking, dressed better and built healthier huts; besides they effectively policed their camps and
many of them cut hay for the military. But sickness persisted to an alarming degree and a large number of individuals migrated to the ·highlands to escape the fevers of the
river valley. In fact, during November, 1873, out of the 2058
Indians registered on the agency books, only 992 were present for ration issues. Yet, Inspector William Vandever, who
visited the reservati9n in the early winter, reported to
Delano that despite the unsatisfactory condition the untiring
14.

Williams to Smith, Sept. 1, 1873, 43 Cong., 1 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, voL iv,

p. 655.

15. Williams to Smith, Sept. 15, 1873, I. 0., W 1237; Smith to Williams, Nov. 6,
1873, L. B. no. 113, p. 504.
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efforts of Williams indicated a bright future for the next
year. 16
The military had no difficulty with the Indians on the
Verde Reservation during the winter of 1873-1874, and
General Crook, after visiting them in early February, informed Commissioner of Indian Affairs E. P. Smith that
an outlay of $25,000 on an irrigation project would result
in the development of self-sufficiency, with an annual saving
of $50,000. The overburdened Indian Office was unable to
take such a constructive step, but the sudden insanity of
Dr. Williams practically gave full control to the military.
As a result, the military decided to direct all agency activities with the exception of keeping the records, which work
was to be continued by Oilver Chapman, the agency clerk,17
A dam was started on the Verde River at once~ Materials
were bought with money saved by buying hay from the
bands and by funds derived from the sale of beef hides that
were collected at the beef- issues. Bribes and excess ration
issues induced the Apache captains to persuade the Indians
to furnish the labor. Forty acres of excellent vegetables
were thus placed under cultivation, apparently to the great
satisfaction of both the military officers and the tribesmen.18
But divided authority at the agency quickly proved to
be a failure. Chapman criticized' the military methods of
issue and discipline, especially when the officers assumed
full credit for the successful work of the summer of 1874.
Disgusted because some of his mail had been opened by order
of Crook, and declaring he received no instructions from the
Indian Office, he prepared to leave for California. 19 In the
meantime, the commissioner of Indian affairs decided to
concentrate the Verdes on some other reservation, but he
had not decided when. However, the military was to have
16. Williams to Comm., Nov. 21, 1873, I. 0., W 1690; Vandever to Delano, Nov. 6,
1873, I. F., 1400. See the Commissioner of Indian Affairs' views in R. B. I. C., 1873.
p. 67.

17. Chapman to Smith, April 23, 1874, I. 0., C 346; Crook to Smith, April 24,
1874, I. 0., C 679.
18. Capt. J. W. Mason to Crook, April 23, 1874, I. 0 .. C 679.
19. Chapman to Smith, Aug. 12, 1874, I. 0., (n. f.).
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full control until the removal should be effected. Strangely,
poor Chapman first learned of the new arrangement when
an army lieutenant appeared and forcibly took over the
agencY,20
The military strongly opposed the bureau's plan to
remove the Indians of the Verde Valley. To Crook's view
these heterogeneous bands could only be controlled by a
continuous military threat. If removed to the White Mountain country, troop movements would be difficult, he said,
and there would be little arable land; while if removed to the
Colorado, the bands would be quickly exterminated by the
vicious inroads of social diseases. He also insisted that a
removal would violate his treaty of the preceding year. But
the commissioner of Indian affairs, supported by the board
of Indian commissioners and the Dutch Reformed people,
persisted in their plans for concentration. 21
Chapman was now restored as special agent through
the influence of the church. He assumed charge on November 13, 1874, but military hostility, insufficient supplies and
an atmosph~re of uncertainty about removal, made him reluctant to do any work of a constructive nature. Nevertheless, he prevented an outbreak when his supplies became exhausted by entering into a temporary contract with Arizona
dealers for 200,000 pounds of flour, 12,000 pounds of barley
and 10,000 pounds of corn. He also procured 500 blankets
that had been ordered the year before. 22 In December, the
wheels of officialdom moved, and in the interests of efficiency
and economy, a decision was made to move the Verde Indians
to San Carlos. 23
20. Comm. to Delano, May 23, 1874, R. B. no. 24,
24, 1874, 1. 0., C 490.
21. Crook to A. G., April 10, 1874, A. G. 0., 5228;
23, 1874, 1. 0., F 418; R. B. I. C., 1874, p. 107.
22. Chapman to Smith, Nov. 23, 1874, I. 0., C 1057.

p.

408;

Chapman to Smith,

June

J. M. Ferris to Smith, Sept.

According to Chapman, the military interfered in the work of the agency because
they were filled with "feelings of jealousy and chagrin at seeing so much accomplished without military coercion." Chapman to Smith, Dec. 1, 1874, 1. 0., C 1062,
Jan. 11, 1875, C 123.
23. Delano to Comm., Dec. 21, 1874, 1. 0., I 1516.
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Colonel L. E. Dudley, the former superintendent of New
Mexico, was selected to direct the removal. He arrived at the
reserve, early in February, 1875, only to find that interested
persons were protesting the removal through Territorial
Delegate McCormick, and that General Crook looked upon
the undertaking as an impossibility. However, the general
furnished him an escort and a packtrain of fifty-three animals. The Indians resisted the move in council, but due
to their severe punishment in 1873, they dared use. no
force to avoid their transfer. On February 27, Chapman
with a small escort led 1,400 individuals away from the
reservation that had been promised them forever, and upon
which had been constructed many permanent improvements
that pointed the way to a civilized life. 24 Seven days wererequiredto cover the distance of one hundred and eighty miles
to San Carlos, and en route a desperate factional fight resulted in the killing of seven Indians and the wounding of
seven others. Upon the arrival of the several bands, Agent
John P. Clum, the San Carlos agent, relieved the tension by
assigning the opposing groups different locations; then, a
few days later, he diplomatically induced them to give up
their arms. 25 The Verde removal, thus consummated, ended
the Apache question in west-central, Arizona from the geographical standpoint; but in concentrating the Verde bands
upon the San Carlos Reservation, the real problem of their
control was perhaps more difficult than ever before.26
The removal of the Verde bands-a sharp modification
of Apache management as originally planned by Colyer and
24. Dudley to Smith, April 3, 1875, I. 0., D 200; Gen. August V. Kautz to Col.
O. E. Babcock, Oct. 20, 1875, I. 0., P 518. (This letter was sent direct to President
Grant's secretary.)
A large 'wagon train, retained at an expense of $7200, hauled all the bulky property and the infirm Indians by way of Phoenix.
25. Chapman to Smith, Mar. 20, 1875, I. 0., 487; Clum to Smith, Mar. 28, 1875,
I. 0., C 484. Clum ignored Chapman as subagent. The commissioner therefore abolished the:'Verde subagen·cy. Courteously, he gave Chapman a leave of sixty days in
which to find work. Smith to Chapman, April 26, 1875, L. B. no. 124, p. 126, June 11,
1875, ibid., p. 445.
26. The Verde Reservation was abolished by an executive order of· April 23,
1875. See Executive Orders Relating to· Indian Reservations, p. 5.
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Howard-did not interrupt the constructive trend of the
regime initiated at Camp Apache among the Coytero bands
in 1871-1872. Dr. Soule, who became agent at the time of
Howard's second visit, was relieved early in December, 1872,
by James E. Roberts,· a nominee of the Dutch Reformed
group.27 Fortunately, the Indians reacted most favorably
to the change and they caused no trouble until several severe epidemics sharply reduced their numbers in the following February. Great numbers of the survivors then relieved
their distress by inebriation,and in the violence that naturally followed, many individuals were killed and numerous
attacks were made on citizens. Some of the braves, in trying
to conceal the criminals from the agent, also evinced a tendency towards insubordination. 28
Roberts, from the time of his arrival, felt that an increase in the tribesmen's private property would make them
less inclined to go to war~ For this reason he pressed and
succeeded in getting the fifteen head of cattle that President
Grant had promised Miguel at the time the chief visited
Washington with General Howard. In addition Commissioner Smith provided the Coyoteros with fourteen extra
heifers and one hundred sheep. The Indians were greatly
elated, and bestowed such care on the stock that Inspector
Vandever~ late in 1873, reported stockraising to be a civilizing influence which would soon make the Indians conservative, provided the Indian Bureau issued sufficient breeding
stock to take full advantage of the opportunity.29 Roberts
also maintained that the Indians would "become civilized
just as soon as they became lovers of money." And to get
the money he suggested that the commissary at the posts
27.

9, 1872,

9.

Bendel! to Roberts, Dec.
S. L. B. ~0I. ii, p.
Dr. Soule, as a military
Burgeon, was moved to the Department of California at his own request. Soule to
Walker, Nov.
1. 0., S
Roberts to Bendel!, Feb.
I. 0., Ariz. Misc. To prevent the making
of Utiswin" Roberts asked for meal in place of corn. He also requested soda instead of
the vast quantities of soap that were sent him. Roberts to Smith, July
1. 0.,
R
The Arizona Miner (June 2,
charged that soap was ordered for the.
reserves purely for graft.
Comm. to Roberts, Aug.
L. B. no.
p.
Vandever to Delano,
. Oct. 2,
I. F., 1404.

28, 1872,

28.

232.

29.

364.
28, 1873,

13, 1873,

1873)

1873,

15, 1873,

113,

90;
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purchase all the crops that the Indians niight raise. 30 The
military evidently shared the view, for the adjutant general
ordered that during 1874 all the hay and grain produced at
the various reserves should be bought, and that the contractors should be required to "purchase as much as practicable
from the Indians."31 But of greatest discomfiture to the
Arizona contractors was Roberts' action in suggesting that
contracts for goods be filled at Santa Fe. Supplies from this
point could be furnished at much less cost and delivered in
four months less time than those from San Francisco. This
fact, he thought, would be especially important in the case of
. tools, which, when heretofore ordered for spring use, had
always arrived in the falI.32
Roberts soon proved himself to be an excellent disci:'
plinarian. Not only were several recalcitrant Tonto bands
subjected to the regular agency routine of metal tags;
descriptive lists and frequent musters; but after Miguel's
band had become insubordinate several chiefs were arrested.
And Captain Chiquito, charged with harboring numerous
murderers and also with trading stolen stock to the Zunis,
was sent to the Yuma prison. Several other bands guilty of
inattention to their crops and stock had their liberty of roaming about withdrawn, while still others accused of theft were
punished by a cessation of ration issues until they returned
the stolen animals and brought in the uncontrolled "bad
men." After the bands. had come to respect the agent's
authority, he further cemented his position among them by
persuading the commissioner of Indian affairs to authorize
an issue of 1400 blankets. 33 In fact, Inspector Vandever in
October, 1873; delighted to find that the Coyoteros would
30.

14, 1873.

282.

Roberts to Smith, Aug.
1. 0.. R
With almost no tools the
Coyoteros were cultivating 283 acres of corn.
Gen. E. D. Townsend to· Schofield, Sept.
1. 0 .• W
The officials
thought that the plan would prevent the contractors from bringing .in Mexican laborers. who frequently sold ammunition and liquor to the Indians.
Ferris to Delano, April
1. 0., F
Roberts to Bendell, May
1. 0., B
Roberts to Smith. Sept.. 11.
1. 0., R
Sept.
1. 0 .• R
Smith to Roberts,' Oct.
L. B.
no.
p.

31.

32.
33.
1873.
113,

16, 1873,

372,
450.

11, 1873,
4, 1873,
20, 1873.
374;

6.

548;

1156.

28, 1873.
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have 6000 bushels of corn to sell, quickly confirmed Major
George M. Randall's report that they were "peaceable, well
.
disposed, and under better discipline than ever before."34
.The Indians maintained their cooperative attitude for
several months, and during the spring of 1874 Roberts induced them to dig five miles of irrigation ditches with
whfch three hundred acres of new land were made available
near the agency. This was a fortunate project, for it was
scarcely finished when Crook ordered that no farming would
be allowed except near the post. 35 But less fortunate for the
success of Roberts' regime was the faCt that the military began to interfere in the details of reservation administration.
In July, 1874, Major Randall ordered the punishment of all
Indians who carried passes issued. by the agent. 36
Roberts now reported to Commissioner Smith that the
reserve had been virtually operating under military control.
The officers, he said, were having secret councils with the
Indians, making new chiefs, interfering with farming and
breaking down the morale of the agency assistants. The Indians, led to believe that Crook alone had authority, were
naturally mystified at the intricacies of the white man's control. Furthermore, Roberts said he was unable to disarm
his charges, because of the whiskey that came to them
through the post trader. With the military looking upon him
as "nothing more or less than a commissary sergeant," he
held that the peace plan could never be successful so long
as the troops had their hold at Camp Apache. His views
appeared to be well-founded when in September, 1874, the
military began to supervise the issuance of rations. 37
But of greater misfortune to the integrity of the civil
34. Vandever to Delano, Oct. 2, 1873, I. F., 1414; Randall to A. A. G., Aug. 23.
1873, A. G. 0., 5228.
35. Roberts to Smith, April 7, 1874, 1. 0., R 299; Roberts to Smith, Aug. 31.
1874, 43 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. I, vol. I, p. 594.
36. P. A. to Roberts, July 2, 1874, 1. 0., R 450.
37. Roberts to Smith, July 6, 1874, I. 0., R 561; Ferris to Smith, Sept. 25, 1874,
I. 0., F 409.
In October, Inspector J. W. Daniels found that Roberts had issued cattle at eight
hundred pounds when their real weight was only six hundred pounds. Daniels to
Smith, Oct. 19, 1874, 1. 0., D 1173.
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authority than the opposition of the military was the part
Roberts played in the reduction of the White Mountain Reservation. Proposals for the reduction of the reserve had first
been made in 1873 when it became evident that the eastern
portion, near the present Clifton, Arizona, was rich in mineral deposits. 38 'Charles Lesinsky and later E. M. Pearce,
who declared they did not know their properties were on reservation territory, had brought in over one hundred' men,
expended perhaps as much as $75,000 for equipment and had
been taking out coppor ore since the summer of 1872. When
the true wealth of the region became obvious, Surveyor General John Wasson, Delegate McCormick and Governor Safford began attempts to have the coveted area returned to the
public domain. A petition from Lesinsky on December 10,
1873, started political manipulation between territorial and
federal officials, which soon enmeshed Agent Roberts. And
after a winter of varied and voluminous correspondence 39
from many sources, Commissioner Smith on April 20, 1874,
asked Roberts to reply by telegram regarding the desirability
of reduction. But instead of complying, Roberts compromised
himself during the next two months in a series of conferences he started at Tucson with territorial officials. 40 He
38. Arizona Citizen, Nov. 8, 22, 1873; Safford to Delano, Nov. 26, 1873, 1. 0.,
S 802.
39. The entire, correspondence of the episode is collected in one file. See I. O.
R 809.
40. L. C. Hughes, the territorial attorney general, appears to have been the chief
conspirator. Stating that considerable expense had been involved in the segregation
efforts, Hughes pressed Lesinsky to know how much could be paid to get the mine segregated. When Lesinsky wished to know further particulars, Hughes wrote that he
was "not at liberty to state who the parties are, what the expense is or has arisen
from, or who has paid it;" but saying that he wanted to know "what is the best you
can do," assured Lesinsky that "this whole matter will be conducted in good faith on
our part." A few'days later, Hughes told Lesinsky in'a personal conference that "all
United States business is conducted on basis of buy and sell." In 1. 0., R 809 file, see
especially: Hughes to Lesinsky, June 23, 1874. (Hughes had written Lesinsky an
earlier letter with no date.). Pearce to Wasson, July 13, 1874. (Pearce charged that
Hughes had made the same proposal to him.). Lesinsky to Wasson, July 13, 1874, and
Wasson to Smith, July 18, 1874. Openly charging extortion, Wasson exposed the
scandal in the press. See Arizona Citizen, July 25, 1874. Safford removed Hughes
from office on July 30, after'the local bar association had voted the attorney general
as being unethical. Ibid., Aug. 1, 1874. According to the commissioner of Indian
affairs, Hughes wanted $5,000 for the deal. Smith to Ferris. Oct. 27, 1874. L. B. no.
120, PP. 405-407.
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then tried to avoid his implication by recommending the
proposed reduction;41 but finding his reputation clouded, declared that he had been thrust into a plot designed to bring
about his removal,42 An investigation that followed in the
·fall revealed nothing new, although the commissioner of
Indian affairs did decide that the agent had been made the
unconscious victim' of a plot. 43
Conditions might have improved at the reservation,
, but in December Roberts, still in conflict with the military,
resorted to drunkenness and formed a liaison with a
Mexican strumpet. Lawlessness soon became so flagrant
that the military merely awaited an opportunity to seize
the agency. The occasion arose several weeks later when
Roberts arranged to hold a count of the bands on February
26, 1875. Immediately, the military announced that instead
they would count the Indians on the 27th, and they invited
the agent to act a witness. A prolonged snow storm kept
Roberts from making his count, but he kept the Indians
peaceable by continuing to make issues to them on a basis
of former records. There was some delay, however, and
when certain chiefs remonstrated, Captain F. D. Ogilby
seized the agency by force, ousted Roberts and declared that
a bloody outbreak had been narrowly averted. Much perplexed, Commissioner Smith solved the dilemma by transferring the Camp Apache Agency to Agent Clum.44 Thus,
as in the case of the Verde Indians, the problem of Coyotero
41. Roberts waited until in July before' taking this action. Instead of sending a
telegram direct from Tucson, he returned to Camp Apache and by mail Bent one, dated
July I, to Dr. R. A. Wilbur of Tucson, to transmit to Commissioner Smith. Wilbur did
not get the letter until July 16. Ordinarily letters from the post reached Tucson in two
, to four days. Smith to Ferris, Dec. 28, 1874, L. B. no. 122. p. 137.
42. Roberts to Smith, Aug. 6, 1874, 1. 0 .• R 510. John Titus, the former territorial'
chief justice, declared Roberts had been persecuted by three or four grafters controlled
by a knot of federal officials. Titus to Smith, Aug. 8, 1874, I. 0., T 593. Commissioner
Smith said that Titus encouraged Roberts to get extra pay for the segregation. Smith
to Ferris, Oct. 27, 1874, 01'. cit.
43. Ibid; Daniels to Smith, Dec. 2, 1874, 1. 0., D 1223. Commissioner Smith, in
December, declared that Roberts would be required to resign unless he explained his
delay in correspondence. Smith to Ferris, Dec. 28, 1874, L. B. no. 122, p. 138. Neither
Roberts nor the Bureau appear to have taken further action.
44. Roberts to Smith, Mar. 3, 1875, 1. 0., R 156; Ogilby to A. A. G., Mar. 11, 1875,
A. G. 0., 1677; Smith to Clum, Mar. 31, 1875, L. B. no. 124, P. 77.
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management was also merged with that of the San Carlos
bands.
The peace plan from the time of its inception among the
Verde and Coyotero bands was sharply modified by military
interference. But among the Chiricahuas, the experiment of
peace was to be shaped by civil hands throughout. In fact,
immediately after the peace with Cochise was made in 1872,
Agent Jeffords settled down without military aid to carry
out Howard's generous promises. He was not long in learning that little tangible support was to be expected from his
superiors. At first he was furnished sufficient beef, but
nothing else; and when he made some unauthorized purchases the superintendent reprimanded him. I; Later, in the
spring of 1873, the Indian Bureau sent him a consignment
of subsistence supplies valued at $4,069. 45
The agent was quite satisfied with the excellent conduct
of his charges who" to the disgust of "prophetic croakers,"
did not leave the reservation at the close of the winter. Cochise cooperated by, turning over all stolen animals and
Jeffords led an arduous life keeping the bands "straight."
Apparently no aid came to him during the summer of 1873;
neither was anything of an official nature done for the In,;.
dians. But by furnishing medicines at his own expense and
by exchanging his excess flour for trad'er's corn Jeffords
saved' the Chiricahuas from the usual epidemics of fevers
and dietary troubles. 46 Such irregular practices, of course,
brought him into disfavor with his superiors, but as a consequence they were led to consider his problems. In August,
1873, the Indian Bureau promised to pay the indebtedness
of $6200 owed by the Chiricahua Agency, and a few weeks
later when such "satisfactory results of the peace policy"
became apparent, the acting commissioner liberally supplied the Indians for the first time. 47
45. Jeffords to Smith; Aug. 31, 1873, 43 Cong., 1 sess., H. E. D. no. I, vol. iv, p.
659; Bendell to Jeffords, Jan. 2, 1873, S. L. B. vol. ii, p. 39; Jeffords to Bendell, April
15, 1873, 1. 0., B 229.
46. Jeffords to Howard, May 25, 1873, 1. 0., H 495; Jeffords to Smith, July 25,
1873, 1. 0., J 583.
47. Acting Comm. to Delano, Sept. 26, 1873, I. D.
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Unfortunately, conditions among the Chiricahuas were
not promising for the future. The warriors, well supplied
with guns and ammunition, preferred to hunt and make
"tiswin" rather than to take up the practices of sedentary
life. Cochise was also losing his influence with advancing
age; besides, there was little harmony among his bands.
Furthermore, Inspector Vandever reported that the very
inaccurate co:unt of over 1100 Indians probably included
four hundred disaffected and insubordinate -visitors who
were only too eager to encourage raids into Mexico. In
characterizing the Chiricahuas as a group of wild mountain
Indians adverse to civilization and instruction, he insisted
that they would never work as long as they could get a living
by any other method. Neither were the agent's methods encouraging: obedience was purely voluntary; the Indians
were never mustered; visiting braves were rationed; and
rations enough for whole bands were issued every fifteen
days to a few individuals who were supposed to represent
the larger groups. From Jeffords' viewpoint reform was
impracticable. 48
The problem of Chiricahua management was further
complicated, because the southern boundary of the reserve
was identical with fifty-five miles of the northern boundary
of Mexico. Crook's superiors had early characterized the
location of the Chiricahuas next to Mexico as a "breach of
good neighborhood," and there appeared to be much truth
to the assertion, especially when it was learned that the
most vicious Indians from the Tulerosa, San Carlos and
White Mountain Reservations gravitated toward the Chiricahua country, where they there joined the incorrigibles in
raids against the nearby Mexican settlements.49 Crook, fearing that embarrassing diplomatic difficulties might arise,
early in 1873 decided to enforce General Orders no. 10 among
the Chiricahuas. However the undertaking was immediately
48. Vandever to Delano, Oct. 18, 1873, 1. F., 1397; Jeffords to Smith, Aug. 81,
1873, op. cit., p. 660.
49. Schofield to A. G., Dec. 26, 1872, A. G. 0., 286; Crook to A. G., Feb. 11,
1873, A. G. 0., 831.
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dropped, for the general not only learned that Howard had
promised Cochise immunity from the military, but also that
the chief understood raids into Mexico were not to be considered as a violation of the peace. Howard was now pressed
for a definitive statement regarding the detailed provisions
of the treaty, but a voluminous and tiresome correspondence
throughout the summer merely tended to substantiate the
view that the Chiricahuas were to be managed without the
use of troops. 50
Meanwhile, Jeffords continued his paternal but loose
management of the Chiricahuas, and the fact that the tribe
failed to advance towards civilization was mainly caused by
factors beyond his control. In September, 1873, he removed
the bands from Sulphur Springs to the San Simon, where the
prospects for agriculture were brighter; but the unhealthful nature of the new location caused Inspector Vandever, in
November, to order them removed to Pinery Canyon, a
region where sedentary life was impossible. Requests for a
school now failed; the Indian Office even neglected to provide a sufficient amount of annuity goods for the winter of
1873-1874.51 The younger braves ~ere only deterred from
raiding by the most vigorous labor of Cochise and Jeffords,
and the reserve would have been deserted had not the agent
been able to issue a fairly regular supply of corn and beef.
As an added weight to his burdens, he felt compelled to feed
about four hundred visitors, who as recalcitrants at the
other Apache. reserves had taken refuge with the Chiricahuas. 52
.
.
Although the department of the interior was unwilling
to modify its civil policy as regards the Chiricahuas, the idea
of removing them to some other reservation was taking root.
Vandever's report in January, 1874, indicated that their
60. Ibid. See also, Sherman to Seety. of War (with an endorsement by Howard),
Feb. 28, 1873, I. 0., 783; Gov.!. Pesquira to Safford, Mar. 14, 1873, in Arizona Citizeon.,
. April 6; 1873; Smith to Howard, Sept. 19, 1873, 1. D.; Howard to Comm., Sept. 23,
1873, 1. D.
61. Jeffords to Smith; Sept. 1, 1874, 43 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. i, p. 696.
62. Ibid.; Vandever to Comm., Jan. 23, 1874, 1. D.
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reserve would always be a center for renegades, a source of
trouble with Mexico and a place devoid of the requisites for
the development of a civilized life. He was therefore in favor
of removing them to New Mexico, but Commissioner Smith
thought the proposal impossible. Nevertheless, in order to
) provide a future reservation, if needed, Canada Alamosa was
withdrawn from the public domain. 53
Superintendent Dudley Of New Mexico was now ordered
to sound the Chiricahuas regarding the possibility of their
removal. He reached their reserve late in May, 1874, only to
find Cochise at the point·of death ;54 but of more serious import, the attitude of the chief's bands convinced him,that they
would resist removal to the bitter end. However, he was
surprised to find that the two hundred and fifty Southern
Apache visitors were quite willing to return to Canada Alamosa. Thus, with the general situation so delicate, the superintendent decided against making any specific recommendations. 55
Jeffords reluctantly retained his position as agent,
largely as a matter of duty. Although he had no difficulty in
keeping his charges quiet, the evidence was plain that they
were making no progress towards civilization. Early in
September, lie reported that 930 individuals were under his
control, but two weeks later Inspector J. W. Daniels observed
that only 645 Indians were present for rations. Yet Daniels
strongly insisted that the results of Jeffords' civil control
were superior to those obtained at the other Apache reserves,
where the military played a prominentpart. 56
Many of Jeffords' troubles were due to the fact that the
Chiricahuas' close kinsmen, the Southern Apaches, had not
been reduced to satisfactory reservation control. In fact,
53. Delano to Secty. of War. Jan. 7, 1874, Land Division L. B. no. 14, p. 106;
Arizona Citizen. Feb. 7, 1874; Dudley to Smith, Mar. 28, 1874, I. 0., D 339.
54. Cochise
eldest son, to be
Citizen, June 13,
55. Dudley
1874, op. cit.
56. Daniels

died on June 8, 1874. The bands immediately chose Tahzay, Cochise's
their chief. Jeffords to Smith, June 10, 1874, I. 0., J 705; Arizona
1874.
to Smith, June 30, 1874, 1. 0., D 1002; Jeffords to Smith, Sept. I,
to Smith, Sept. 29, 1874, I. F., 121, Nov. 7, 1874, 1. 0., D 1163.
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a great portion of this group instead of moving from Canada'
Alamosa to Colyer's Tulerosa Reservation, either roamed
about their former haunts or took refuge with the Chiricahuas. Those bands that did move to Tulerosa quickly tired
of both the reserve and the agent and, in the hope of forcing
the government to return them to Canada Alamosa, attempted to intimidate the agency officials. But their new
agent, B. M. Thomas, from the time of his appointment in
January, 1873, maintained his control as far as.agencyman-·
agement was concerned. The military cooperated with
Thomas, and to prevent the usual spring exodus they kept
five companies of cavalry near the reserve limits. The command nonchalantly moved about a few· miles at day, but
always with no special objective in view. This unusual action
was quite· effective in restraining most of the warriors;
nevertheless, during the summer some scattered raids were
made against the Rio Grande settlements. Major W. R. Price
attempted to arrest the culprits on July 25, but the approach
of his three troops of cavalry was the signal for a general
flight; and en masse, the Southern Apaches fled towards
the Chiricahua country.57
The problem of their control now became more difficult
than ever before, for out of the six hundred individuals
rationed during the winter of 1872-1873, four hundred were
presumed to have taken refuge with Cochise. 58 The commissioner of Indian affairs ordered Jeffords to stop issues
to all visitors without permits and Inspector Vandever
insisted that all transients should be arrested. However,
th~ inspector was careful to state that more progress could
be accomplished with less military participation in the management of the reserves. Jeffords, faced with the actual
problem of managing the visitors, issued enough extra
rations to keep them.at peace. 59
57. Thomas to Dudley, Sept. 4, 1873, 48 Cong., 1 sess., H. E. D. no. I, vol. iv, p.
648; Vandever to Delano, Sept. 22, 1873, I. F., 1384; Price to A. A. G., July 80,.
A. G. 0., 3828.
.
58. Vandever to Delano, Oct. 18, 1873, I. F., 1397.
59. Smith to Jeffords, Nov. 21, 1878, L. B. no. 115, p. 42; Vandever to Comm.,
Jan. 28, 1874, I. D.
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Two hundred of the Southern Apaches returned to the
Tulerosa Reservation during the summer and fall of 1873.
But still yearning for their old homes at Canada Alamosa;
they remained with Agent Thomas only through fear of military punishment. Yet they proved to be docile, and during
the following winter sent some of their children to school,
handled agency stores for pay in merchandise and constructed a crude irrigation project. In the spring of 1874
they planted the new irrigated area to vegetables, but a kill':'
ing frost in June and rumors that the government intended
to transfer them back to Canada Alamosa, destroyed what
little interest they retained for the Tulerosa Reservation. 60
The Southern Apaches, in fact, perplexed the Indian
Office almost as much as the Chiricahuas. Colyer had moved
them to the Tulerosa Reservation in order to inaugurate the'
"Peace Plan," but now the officials believed that the Indians
would be less troublesome if returned to Canada Alamosa.
Telegraphic correspondence proved that Superintendent
Dudley had also changed his mind: He reported that a reestablishment of the agency at Canada Alamosa would satisfy
the citizens and Indians, induce a sedentary mode of life and
allow a successful concentration of the Chiricahuas at the
same point. 61 Then Commissioner Smith ordered further
investigation, but an executive order issued by President
Grant on April 9, 1874, which designated the area to be a
reservation, proved that a decision had already been made. 62
The decision to transfer the Southern Apaches to
Canada Alamosa was undoubtedly made in an effort to keep
them away from the Chiricahua Reservation. But even after
the removal Jeffords was authorized to feed visiting groups
so that they might be deterred from going on into Mexico. 63
Those bands that did move to Canada Alamosa refrained
from marauding upon the surrounding settlements, but a
Thomas to Smith, Aug. 31,1874,43 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. I, vol. i; p. 617.
Dudley to Smith, April 14, 1874, 1. 0., D 425.
Smith to Dudley, April 15, 1874, L. B. no. 118, P. 43; E",ecutive' Orders Relating to Indian ReseT'IJations, p. 120.
63. Comm. to Jeffords, June 30, 1874, L. B. no. 118, p. 394.
60.
61.
62.
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traffic in domestic animals that came from the Chiricahua
Reservation, indicated that the old association remained unbroken. ,Officials now realized that the Chiricahua and
Southern Apaches problem was far from a satisfactory solution; they were also aware that any acts of hostility by
either of the two groups would call for the most drastic
action on the part of the government. 64 .
Despite the fact that the affairs of the Chiricahuas and
the Southern Apaches were far· from a satisfactory state,
the evidence shows that the peace plan had proved immediately effective in reducing the difficulty of controlling these
two erratic Apache groups. A similar result had been attained in the case of the Verde bands. And even in the face
of a hostile military opposition at Camp Apache, the peace
plan had improved the government's relations with the
friendly Coyoteros. But at the Camp Grant Reservation the
plan failed to effect any decided change in the status of the
Arivaipa and Pinal groups. This single exception probably
occurred· because of General Howard's decision that it would
be necessary to remove them to the isolated San Carlos
Reservation and also because of the difficulty in finding a
competent agent for the bands.
The difficulty in finding a satisfactory agent for the
Camp Grant Indians is shrouded in deep mystery-it
appears that the territorial politicians were having great
influence in the management of· the reserve at the time.
George H. Stevens, whom Howard made temporary agent in
August, 1872, was replaced on December 20, by Charles F.
Larrabee of Maine. Since several weeks were required for
Larrabee to reach his post, Stevens was apparently not notified of the change. 65 During the interval the Indians appeared to be satisfied, arid although the agent conducted
64. Capt. A. B. Kauffman to A. A. G., Sept. 25, 1874, A. G. 0., 4188; Dudley to
Smith, Oct. 27, 1874, 43 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. i, p. 610.
65. Walker to Larrabee, Dec. 20, 1872, L. B. no. 110, p. 231.
A malicious sergeant of the First Cavalry wrote a scurrilous letter against Howard,
which, posed as a work of Stevens, led to the latter's replacement. Walker to Howard,
Dec. 21, 1872, L. B. no. 110, P. 231; Stevens to McCormick, Sept. 6, 1873, 1. 0., M 127.
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affairs smoothly the superintendent vaguely accused him of
"bad management" and "official corruption." But evidently
certain political machinations were occurring, for Dr. R. A.
Wilbur of Tucson was placed in temporary charge on February 9, 1873. 66
The next day, General Crook, while holding a conference with the chiefs, learned that the bands were eager to
remove to San Carlos at once. He quickly persuaded Wilbur
to take action, and giving complete military cooperation, had
the satisfaction of seeing the entire group of 1,500 Indians
transferred during the next five days to their new home. 67
The change in locationnaaturally produced a temporary
relaxation of discipline among the bands, with the result
that disruptive conflicts for leadership broke out. The Indians also irked by the presence of two companies of cavalry
threatened war if the troops were not removed atonce. 68
Just at this most inopportune moment Larrabee arrived
and assumed his duties as agent, relieving Dr. Wilbur. But
Wilbur had probably contemplated to stay much longer
and "being· thus immediately ousted, did all that a
thoroughly bad man could do." He fomented opposition
against the new agent in the hope that the Indians would
either. kill or drive him from the reservation. Should this
occur, Wilbur felt he would be retained in office and thus be
in a position to control the purchase of the reservation supplies to his own and his friends' advantage. 69
The Indians probably would have eliminated Larrabee
within a short time had not rivalry among the bands made
it expedient to use him as a gO-between. As a result, he became an important figure in their councils, and by promising
them liberal supplies succeeded in getting the bands to start
an irrigation ditch and to plant sixty acres of coin. But
66. Bendell to Walker, Feb. I, 1873, S. L. 8., vol. ii, p. 91; 43 Cong., 1 sess.,
·H. E. D. no. I, vol. iv, p. 657.
.
67. Wilbur to Smith, Mar. 3, 1873, I. 0., Ariz. Mise; Larabee to Comm., Mar.
29, 1873, ibUi.
.
68. Larrabee to Comm., April 30, 1873, ibid.
69. Larrabee to Bendell, Feb. 23, 1873, ibUi.; Titus to Smith, July 25, 1878, I. O.
L 208.
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unfortunately the long-standing leadership of Eskiminzin
and Chiquito was challenged by two aggressive warriors,
Chuntzand Cochinay. Even worse, the favorite wife of
Chiquito was seduced by one of Chuntz's followers; and al:most as if compensation were governing, one of the latter's
headmen was shot dead by a partisan of Eskiminzin. Several days of intense excitement followed these occurrences,
and Larrabee, realizing the impractiCability of managing
the Apaches without the aid of the military, requested that
a company of cavalry be posted at the agency.70
The immediate arrival of the troops probably prevented
a general stampede of the Indians, but the proximity of the
military offered no check to the nefarious plotting of Dr.
Wilbur. 71 Larrabee's control weakened meanwhile, and on
a ration day near the last of May, 1873, Sheshet, a notorious
warrior belonging to Cochinay's band, attempted to assassinate him. In the resultant melee, Lieutenant Jacob Almy, in
temporary. chp.rge of the troops was brutally murdered.
Larrabee now gave the military full control and deciding
a few days later that his influence was completely destroyed
sent in his resignation with a recommendation that a military man be named as agent. 72 ·
The military, of course, seized the opportunity to lash
with fury at the. incompetence of the civil administration.
Captain W. H. Brown informed Crook that "it is not disputed that this reservation has been rotten to the core. The
Indians have been tampered· with, the agents have been
rascals and knaves, the Interpreters have been liars and
thieves. . ." 73 The general even charged that the "criminal
conduct of Dr. Wilbur;" which he now "virtually confessed,"
70; Larrabee to Comm., Mar. 29, 1873, I. 0., L 53; RepOTt, Board of Investigation on Lt. Jacob Almy's Death, A. G. 0., 2933.
71. By liberal gifts Wilbur won the confidence of both Eskiminzin and the
agency interpreter. Wilbur wanted the agency beef to be delivered on hoof (graft
was easy by this method), while Larrabee insisted that it be furnished on the block.
When Wilbur saw that he could not "put a head" on Larrabee, he was ready to sac·
rifice life "to gain his purpose." Ibid.
72. Ibid.; Larrabee to Capt. W. H. Brown, June I, 1873, I. 0., B 586; Larrabee
to Smith, June 30, 1873, I. 0" L 208.
73.. Brown to A. A. G., June 15, 1873, A. G. 0., 2933.
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was merely "the outcropping of the old rottenness at Camp
Grant." 74
Fully determined to put a stop to the "weak and vacil-.
lating policy" as administered by the Indian Office, Crook
instructed Brown to inaugurate a "firm and decided" policy
of "impartial justice to all who do well, the olive branch to
all who desire to be at peace, but certain punishment to the
wrongdoers."75 Brown had evidently anticipated the in,.
structions and by a series of daily counts found that there
were only 1,200 Indians on the rolls instead of the 1,500
reported by Larrabee. More important his rigid discipline
and exact rationing not only reduced drunkenness but also
. brought order and obedience. 76
A constant interest in the growing crops was maintained by many of the Indians-especially by the chiefs and
headmen. Thus convinced that farming would rapidly expand, Brown continued the work upon Larabee's irrigation
ditch. The Indians also showed great interest in the eightythree head of stock cattle that were sent them during the
summer, and Brown, noting that their sense of ownership
was greatly heightened, reported that "their industry only
needs the proper direction to make it permanent and profitable." 77 Because of Brown's careful efforts, the Indians
were soon willing to conform to the 'wishes of the government. ,But the civil authority was not content to allow this
important position to remain in military hands. The commissioner of Indian affairs, therefore, in late October,
ordered the captain to turnover the San Carlos Indians to
Agent Roberts of the Camp Apache Agency.78
74.

3;1873,

75.
76.
77.

3, 1873,
15, 1873,
7, 1873,

Crook to A. A. G., July
ibid. Wilbur acknowledged that his conduct
had been "wrong" and "indiscreet." He wrote Larrabee that he was willing to
make "proper amends for the past." Copy of letter of June
1. 0., L
A. A. G. to Brown, July
A. G. 0.,
Brown to A. A. G., June
op. cit.
Brown to Comm., July
1. 0., B
July
B
Brown
thought that if the contracts were let in Washington the consequent removal of
"local prejudices" would render the Up osition of the Agent more free from embarrassment." Brown to Comm., Aug.
1. 0., B
Vandever to Delano, Oct.
1873~ I. F.,
Comm. to Brown and Roberts,
Oct.
L. B. no. 114, p.

78.
29, 1873,

31, 1873,
13,
365.

2933.

640,

820.
1390;

30, 1873,

31, 1873,
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However, this bureaucratic move appears to have had
no effect on the hold of the military, for Major Randall, who
replaced Captain Brown as commandant of the. agency
guard, assumed at once a dominant role in agency affairs. 79
Much to the Indians~ displeasure, he initiated a very harsh
scheme of discipline, and later, on January 1, 1874, either
through fear or malevolent designs arrested Chief Eskiminzin. 80 Three days afterward the chief escaped only to be
followed into the mountains by seven sympathetic bands.
Most of them returned within a short time, but because of the·
severe weather conditions that prevailed they were allowed
to erect their lodges on the high ground across the Gila from
the agency. While they were thus encamped, a heavy flood
cut off their communication with the agency officials. Chuntz
and his' fellow conspirators now seized this propitious opportunity to again establish themselves as leaders, and on
January 31 while the Gila was still impassable, induced a
band of inebriated warriors to attack a party of freighters
who had been forced to encamp near the Indian village. This
outrage convinced the mass of the Indians that they would
be punished for the crime of a few; therefore, leaving behind
nearly all their possessions, they fled in pandemonium from
the scene of the attack. 8! '
Most of the Indians kept within the limits of the reservation, but some fifty vicious braves raided through to Old
Camp Grant and on to Tempe, killing six persons and destroying much property.82 In conformity with the "Peace Policy"
all the Indians absent from the agency now became objects
79. Roberts, ·on December 9, 1873, assigned the San Carlos Age';cy to Dr. John B.
White, the agency physician. White to Smith, Aug. 9, 1874, 43 Cong., 2 sess., B. E.
D. no. I, vol. i, ,p. 597.
80. Daniels to Smith, Oct. 17, 1874, I. F., 122. Crook fully supported Brown'.
action. Crook to A. G., April 10, 1874, A. G. 0., 1562.
81. White to Roberts, Feb. 1, 1874, r. 0., W 349; Arizona Citizen, Feb. 7, 1874.
Crook in explaining that a "temporizing policy" was considered "expedient" at
San Carlos, substantiates, to a great degree, Clum's later charge that civil-military
conflict, lack of discipline and failure to arrest renegades, caused the outbreak. Crook
to A. G., April 10,·1874, op. cit.; John P. Clum, The Truth About the Apaches (Los
Angeles, 1931), p. 3.
82. Arizona·Citizen, Feb. 14, 28, 1874.
o
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of military management, and troops immediately organized
to pursue them were directed to "take no prisoners." This
action indicated that the military was bent on a policy· of
ruthless extermination. Fortunately for the Apaches, only
a few commands were available for pursuit and these were
kept practically inactive due to raging floods. But after a
short period of terrific hardships, the Indians, fully realizing the folly of their ilHldvised flight, fairly begged to surrender. And when Crook gave them this privilege in April
all the bands returned much crestfallen and with a most
cooperative attitude. 83
During the next three months the penitents proved by
their conduct that they were susceptible of civilization. They
now not only furnished scouts to run down the numerous
criminals and renegades among their bands, but also, by
promptly punishing all fellow members guilty of an .outrage,
proved that they had come to regard discipline as an absolute necessity. Moreover, they successfully cultivated two
hundred and sixty acres of vegetables and grain. Dr. John
B. White, the nominal agent, had little difficulty in persuading them to adopt r~volutionary changes in sanitation. They
built more healthful lodges, used less eye paint, avoided
tainted foods, changed their bathing habits to avoid fevers,
·and the medicine men took up Dr. White's medicinal practices as far as possible. Much impressed with the changed
attitude of his charges, White wrote Commissioner Smith a
long and sanguine letter'ori August 5, 1874, in which ,he suggested that "honesty of purpose" would bring "substantial
improvement" to the Apaches.84 . This suggestion indicated
that Apache control needed a revitalization. And, in fact,
a new order for the San Carlos bands was close at hand, for
six days later John· P. Clum, their new civilian agent, determinedly assumed charge of the San Carlos Agency.85
83.

Clum, lCEskiminzin." in N. Me:r:: BistoT~al RetJiew, vol. iii, p. 408, et seq.:

Arizona Citizen. Feb. 28, 1874.
84.

White to Smith, Aug. 6, 1874, in Arizona Citizen. Dec. 6, 1874. See also White

to Smith, Aug. 9, 1874, op. cit.; Crook to A. A. G., Aug. 31, 1874, 43 Cong., 2 BeSB.,
H. E. D. no. I, vol. ii, p. 61.

86.

Clum to Smith, Aug. 11, 1874, 1. 0., C 704.
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P. CLUM AND THE TRIUMPH OF CIVIL CONTROL
HE ARRIVAL of John P. Clum at San Carlos on August 8,
18741 marked the beginning of a new era in Apache affairs. Appointed as agent on the recommendation of the
Dutch'Reformed Church, he was especially well fitted for the
difficult task that awaited him. 2 In addition to superior education and frontier experience, he possessed extraordinary
energy and tenacity of purpose; furthermore, he had a
natural bent for journalistic controversy-a valuable asset
for any official on the frontier.
Even before Clum assumed his duties he began to suspect that most of the Apache troubles emanated from a,
deadly mixture of civil and military control known to prevail at the reservation. Accordingly, he made a careful study
of the tribe, confirmed' his suspicions and determined to
eliminate the interference of the military in all Indian matters of a purely civil nature. 3
He had likewise decided that the best way to eliminate
the military was to ignore it; therefore, three days after his
arrival, and without the aid of a military officer, he success'"
fully inspected' the villages and counseled with the chiefs.
This bold start made. him very aggressive, and in hastep.ing
to inform the commissioner of the Indians' intelligent, pacific and cooperative attitude, he let it be known that he was
formulating recommendations designed to further curtail
the prerogatives of the military groUp.4
But the military was not content to be so easily ousted.
Lieutenant J. B. Babcock, in command at San Carlos, informed Clum that the military had controlled Apache affairs
since the January outbreak, not to usurp the agent's control,
JOHN

T

1.
2.
3.
4.

Clum to Smith. Aug, 8. 1874, 1. 0., C 682.
Delano to Comm., Mar. 2, 1874, 1. 0., I 227.
Clum to Comm., Aug. 31, ~874, 43 Cong., 2 BeSB., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. i, p. 297.
Clum to Comm., Aug. 11. 1874, I. 0., C 704.
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but merely to obtain a permanent peace. He suggested that
all future councils with the Indians should be held jointly to
promote harmony and that the military was willing to sustain the civil authority if the agent would endorse orders
given under General Crook's instructions. 5 Clum, of course,
agreed that harmony was very essential, but his decisive
reply settled the question that in all non-military matters he
intended to exercise sole control. 6
Despite this rebuff, Babcock still insisted upon cooperation "where duties touch closely at the edges." He immediately had a friendly conference with Clum, and then
informed Crook that although the agent resented the "slightest touch" of military control, he nevertheless saw the sense
of military supervision of passes and counts. He· also reported that Clum was in full accord with the military policy
"to punish wrongdoers, to keep out outlaws and to make the
Indians work."7 But Crook did not waver, and on August 20
.he instructed Babcock to disregard the agent's wishes if they
became an impediment to the safety of the reservation. Thus
fortified, Babcock resolved to retai~ the advantages the
military had gained "with or without permission" of the
agent. 8 But that very day the agent withdrew the right to
make counts and issue passes, stating moreover, that all
facts of record would be available for inspection at the
agency office. 9
Crook now faced a dilemma, and after inviting instructions,IO sent Major Randall from Fort Apache to iron out the
difficulty. Even this move failed, for Clum announced that
all coercive measures would be reported dfrectly to the secretary of the interior. Randall therefore decided against
interference although in making this decision he was
6. Babcock to Clum, Aug. 16, 1874. A. G. 0., 4008.
6. Clum to Babcock, Aug. 16. 1874, I. 0 .• C 789.
7. Babcock to A. A. G., Aug. 18. 1874, A. G. 0 .• 4008.
8. Crook to Babcock. Aug. 20, 1874. ibid; Babcock to A. A. G.• Aug. 29, 1874. ibid.
9. Clum to Babcock. Aug. 29. 1874. I. 0 .• C 789.
10. Crook to A. A. G., Sept. 8, 1874. I. 0 .• W 1664. The general was no doubt
sincere in believing that lack of proper surveillance might result in another Camp
Grant Massacre affair.
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prompted by the thought that the inexperienced agent would
soon be glad to call in the help of the military.u
During the time of the short and decisive controversy
Clum's time had not been sufficiently monopolized to interfere with his regular agency duties. He first won the Indians' confidence, and then inaugurated a simple plan of
self-government whereby t}J.e bands were to be policed by
four bucks of their own choice. The plan demonstrated its
immediate efficacy, for the bands not only submitted to disarmament, but they also gave up the manufacture of
tiswin. 12
'
With equal energy, he struck at the lack of proper
agency facilities by starting a building program within ten
days after his arrival. He requested $5,000 for the work,
but got $12,000.13 Thus encouraged, and more convinced
than ever that labor was one of the most effective ways to
civilize the Indians, he employed them to as great an extent
as possible. An office and quarters for· the personnel were·
first started; then he elaborated his plans with the aim of
making the work last for several years. The Indian's responded eagerly and were willing to do any kind of work at
fifty cents per day. Clum suggested to the commissioner,
however, that payment in goods would have a greater civilizing effect upon them than money wages alone. 14
He also included in his plans a reorganized farm program. Each of the ten bands w·as to be given an equal allotment of land from the agency farm, and they were to remove
their villages close to the scene of their work. He asked for
11. CIum to Smith, Sept. 8, 1874, I. 0., C 789.
A little later when Clum learned that the Indian Office was elated with the outcome
of the controversy, he grew much bolder, announced that the military was the chief
obstacle to the consummation of the peace policy, and requested that all the troops be
withdrawn beyond the limits of the reservation. Smith to Clum, Oct. 6, 1874, L. B.
no. 120, p. 265; Clum to Comm., Oct. 16, 1874, I. 0., C 887.
12. Clu'.", Apache Agent, p. 134, et seq.
The idea· of Indian police was not new in Arizona. A force had been used successfully on tbe Navajo reservation in 1872. See R. C. 1. A., 1872, p. 296. The Dutch Reformed officials advocated a police force in 1873. See R. B. 1. C., 1873, p. 180.
13. Smith to Clum, Sept. 14. 1874, L. B. no. 119, P. 464.
14. CIum to Comm., Aug. 22, 1874, I. 0., C 707.
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scales, blacksmith and carpenter tools, harness, oils, wagons,
mule shoes and several teams of mules. If supported in his
program and furnished necessary equipment, he predicted
that within a year he could show the Indian Office unexpected results. 15
The Indians readily adjusted themselves to the new administration. The men were counted daily and the women
and children every Saturday. With the aid of an "Apache
court" the enforcement of discipline practically ceased to be
a problem. Rations were issued on a weekly basis, each
individual receiving the same amount. Frequently, friendly
groups pooled their quotas in order to receive a full sack of
flour or a whole beef. 16
When Inspector Daniels visited the agency in October,
he was struck with the changed attitude of happiness and
satisfaction noticeable among all the bands. It was obvious
to him that their success in agriculture had already placed
them far ahead of any of the other Apaches in his district,
and he urged the introduction of sheep as an added incentive
to keep them near home and out of the mountains. The
agent received praise for his initial success and he was moreover strongly supported in his contention that the civil
authority should have sole control over reserve affairs,17
Of even greater importance, the inspector learned
about military interference at first hand. In a council with
the chiefs 18 he was asked to return certain San Carlos Indians who had been held captive at Fort Apache since the
15. Clum to Comm., Aug. 31, 1874, op. cit., p. 298.
Although he had been at San Carlos only a short time, he was nevertheless very
severe on the military in his annual report. Their tardiness in arresting drunken
renegades, he believed, had been the cause of most of the late disasters. He did think,
bowever, that the recent campaign had demonstrated that outlaws would be captured,
and that bands could be prevented from leaving and returning at their own pleasure.
Ibid.
16. Clum to Comm., Aug. 26, 1784, I. 0., C 753. A weekly ration for each one
hundred Indians consisted of: 300 lbs. of beef, 50 lbs. of flour, 8 lbs. of sugar, 4 lbs; of
coffee, 1 lb. of salt and 2 bars of soap. Clum, Apache Agent, p. 148. .
17. Daniels to Smith, Oct. 17, 1874, I. F., 122.
18. Eskiminzin was once again headchief. He 'had recently been released from
Fort Grant through the efforts of the new agent. Clum, "Eskiminzin," in N. Me.,. H.
Rev., iv (Jan., 1929), 4.
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Januaryoutbreak. He agreed to try, and, after reaching the
fort secured the release of twenty-nine prisoners from Agent
Roberts. Within a short time after they had been started
for San Carlos, a troop of cavalry under the command of
Major Ogilby, arrested the Indians and hurried them back
to the post. Although the major admitted that his action
was partly motivated by his personal feelings towards Roberts, yet he insisted that it was in conformity with General
Orders No. 10.19
Such action naturally won. the enmity of the Dutch Reformed officials. They denounced military interference with
the work of their agents and threatened to cease their cooperation if the Indian Office failed to. render the proper
support. 20
Evidently the commissioner was impressed, for he informed Secretary Delano that the Indians at San Carlos and
Camp Apache were sufficiently under civil control to warrant the removal of the military for "quite" a distance and
that their permanent removal at an early date would have a
beneficial effect on all agency administrationP
No action followed, but for several months after the
departure of the inspector, affairs at San Carlos became
more routine. The agent' fed his Indians well, made them
labor for everything they received, induced them to sow one
hundred acres of cereals, and won the hearty approval of
the press. Even the governor spoke felicitously of agency
management to the legislature. 22
The Indians appeared very happy with the new regime;
only thirty-two recalcitrants were taken during the winter,
19. Clum to Comm., Oct. 18, 1874, 1. 0., C 906.
20. FerriB to Smith, Sept. 25, 1874, 1. 0., F409; FerriB to Smith, Oct. 17, 1874,
I. 0., F 468.
21, Smith'to Secty., Nov. I, 1874, 43 Cong., 2 BeBB., H. E. D. no. I, voL i, p. 869.
The board of. Indian commiBBionerB also demanded BUpport for the agent against
the military. R. B. I. C., 1874, p. 107.
22. Arizona Citizen, Dec. 19, 1874; Journals' of Eighth LegiBl4tifJe ABBemblll,
1875, p. 87.
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and by February not a renegade could be found in their
former haunts. 23
By the use of 2500 pounds of soap every three months
and immunization against smallpox, the health of the Indians was greatly improved. Already the agent noted a
decided increase in the birth rate. 24 With plentiful funds,25
he rapidly pushed his building program and planned its
extension. In March when he received congratulations for
his "progress" and "success" from the commissioner, it appeared that he had conquered all obstacles at his agency.26
Events and policies 27 elsewhere, however, were to bring
a profound transformation in the complexion of affairs at
San Carlos. The arrival and addition of the Verdes in
March, 1875, occasioned such a change. 28 Naturally, the
move greatly increased Clum's responsibilities, but after a
brief period of uncertainty he subjected the new charges to
his regular system of discipline. As soon as they started
building houses he admitted them to his scheme of self-gov-ernment by appointing four of their own men as police. The
Verde group then realized that they were an integral part
of the San Carlos organization. 29
Just at the time of the removal of the Verdes, an open
rupture in the civil-military controversy at Fort Apache
resulted in a military coup. The agency was seized, Agent
Roberts deposed and the Rev. J. M. Mickly appointed as
temporaryagent. 30 Commissioner Smith weighed the situation for a brief time and determined to hold on to his legitimate rights at all hazards. He therefore ordered Clum to
23. Arizona Citizen. Jan. 23, 1875; Capt. Brayton to A. A. G., Feb. 6, 1876,
A. G. 0., 1123.
24. Clum to Comm., Mar. I, 1875, I. 0., C 406.
25. He had already been furnished $26,187 for agency expenses. Clum to Comm.,
Jan. I, 1875, I. 0., C 100.
26. Smith to Clum, Mar. 16, 1875, L. B. no. 123, P. 445.
27. The policy of placing smaller bands upon the larger reserves, and sometimes
the shifting of larger groups to new locations had been added to the peace plan. Dunn,
Massacres of the Mountains, p. 19. It appears that the idea of a general concentration
of all the western bands was as yet unformed.
28. Cf. supra, p. 194, et seq.
29. Clum to Editor, Sept. 1, 1875, Arizona Citizen, Sept. 18, 1875.
30. Cf. supra, p.
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take charge at Camp Apache until a permanent agent could
be selected. 31 With fifty dependable San Carlos Indians,
Clum proceeded to Camp Apache, receipted for the agency
to Roberts; and arrested the Rev. Mickly for opening Roberts' mail. Then, following a few' days of counseling in
which the Indians came to understand that all orders were
to come from him, he counted them. 32
As this was the first count that had been held at Fort
Apache without military supervision, the commander, Major
F. D. Ogilby, became much excited. Clum was informed that
the military would maintain its control, and count the In'dians the next day even if an attack had to be made on him
and his Indians at a ration issue that had been set for the
same time. But MajorOgilby realized that it was dangerous'
to his commission to:fight peaceable Indians, and when Clum
went ahead with his plans, the major desisted, dismissed his
Indian scouts and stopped resistance to the new agent's
program.33
Military efforts to wreck the civil administration now
took a different form. Since the arrival of the Verdes at
San Carlos, the agent had found it necessary to arrest numerous recalcitrant troublemakers. These were turned over
to the commanding officer, who confined them in the military,
gu~rdhouse. Likewise; the·samearrangement had prevailed
at Fort Apache. Angered at the outcome of his first bout
with the new agent, Major Ogilby quickly perceived that the
recent changes had strained agency discipline to the break- ,
ing point. As a result, he ordered the release of all prisoners held at the two points, and directed that no more should
be received. 34 In desperation, Clum requested to be ordered
to Washington where it might be finally decided whether he,
or the officers who were trying to overthrow him, should
exercise control. 35
31. Smith to Clum, Mar. 31, 1875, L. B. no. 124, p. 77.
32. Clum to Smith, April 16, 1876, I. 0., C 600.
. 33. Clum to Smith, April 24, 1876, I. 0., C 686; Clum to Vandever, May 27, 1877,
1. F., 1660; Clum to Comm., Sept. I, 1876, R. C. 1. A .• p. 216.
34. Post Adjutant to Lt. Ward" April 22, 1876, T. F., 1660.
36. Clum to Smith, May I, 1876, 1. 0., C 686.
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On May '1, when another general count was held at
Camp Apache, it was apparent by the tiswin brawls and
fighting around the camps that the situation was dangerous.
When Clum requested to know if he could rely on military
aid if it should be needed in bringing about order and subordination, he was told that the military would neither "interfere" with the Indians, nor guard any prisoners. He
also learned that the commanding general had issued instructions which only authorized protection to government
property and citizens located at the agencies. As the officers
had already given this information to the Indians, Clum
charged them as being "instigators of insubordination and
hostility."36
By this time the commissioner had decided to end the
deadlock, and the agent was ordered to report at Washington. 37 At the commissioner's office Clum insisted that the
military post at Camp Apache should be removed beyond
the limits of the reservation. This, the commissioner decided was too difficult an undertaking, but he suggested that
it might be feasible to remove the Coyoteros to San Carlos.
Almost at once General Schofield informed the war department that the military had the Coyotero troubles solvedthat a removal to San Carlos would merely undo the success
already made. , The Dutch Reformed Ch~rch supported the
commissioner, and thus encouraged, he advised the secretary
of the interior on June 9, that the 'successful removal of the
Verdes to San Carlos fully justified a similar removal of the
Coyoteros. There, he believed, in an accessible agricultural
region, they would rapidly advance towards civilization. 38
On June 16, Clum was ordered back to Arizona to effect the'
removal at once. 39 '
36. Clum to Capt. Worth, May 2, 1875, I. F., 1660; Worth to Clum, May 2, 1876,
ibid; Clum to Comm., Sept. I, 1875, op. cit.
37. Smith to Clum, ,May 14, 1875, L. B. no. 124, p. 307.
38. Clum, Apache Agent, p. 161; Schofield to A. G., June 2, 1875, I. 0., W 1032;
Ferris to Smith. June 9, 1875, I. 0., F 258; Smith to Secty. of Interior, June 9, 1876,
R. B. no. 26, pp. 265-266.
39. Acting Secty. to Comm., June 16, 1876, I. 0., I 764.
While Clum was in Washington, he received word from Acting Agent Sweeney
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When Clum reached San Carlos, he prepared for the
removal by selecting former agent George H. Stevens and
Chief Eskiminzin with sixty braves to assist him. As all
these Indians were very friendly with· the Coyoteros, he
counted on them to do most of the diplomatic work. Clum
and his assistants reached Camp Apache on July 22, and
immediately began a series of powwows. It was found impossible to move three bands of about four hundred Indians
. because their chiefs and leading men were serving as scouts
for the military. But among the remaining fourteen hundred, about five hundred who had formerly lived near old Camp Goodwin were eager for the change. Many of the
others hesitated to move until their crops were harvested;
and some of them resisted the plan because of the promises
made by General Howard in 1872. A great manY,no doubt,
were deterred by military rumors that they would eventually
be taken to a distant county and killed. Nevertheless, after
Clum had worked out a plan by which six hundred were to
remain on passes at Camp Apache. to harvest their crops,
the remaining eight hundred were started towards San
Carlos on July 26. The cavalcade reached its destination on
July 29, and two days later rations were issued at a general
count. At first all the bands were located near the agency,
but after they had become adjusted to the change, some four
hundred and fifty Indians were allowed to move twenty
miles up the Gila to the site of their former home. 40 '
40. Clum to· Comm., July 1 (?), 1875, I. D. The agent was perhaps suffering
from enthusiasm in this report when he wrote, "Thus about 1400 Indians were then
and there virtually transferred to the San Carlos without trouble, notwithstanding the
strong opposition." See also, Ogilby to A. A. ·G., July 25, 1875; A. G. 0., 4730; Clum
to Comm., Sept. I, 1875, op. cit., p. 215. Clum informed t!:le commanding general that
700 were removed. Clum to Gen. Kautz, July 26,1875, A. G. 0., 4730.
When Maj. Ogilby was asked for his cooperation in making the removal a success,
(Clum to Ogilby, July 20, 1875, I. F., 1660), he replied that he could not "interfere"
as long as the Indians were at peace. Ogilby to Clum, July 20, 1876, ibid. Two weeks
after the removal was made the com;"'anding general ordered Ogilby to furnish Clum an
escort for his personal protection during the removal! The troops, however, were to
compel no Indian to remove. A. A. G. to .Clum, Aug. 14, 1876, ibid.
that Maior Ogilby had ordered Lieutenant Ward "to take no action whatever," in case
of an outbreak, "but to allow the Indians to proceed at pleasure," and that after the
order became known, all Indians arr~sted showed a· tendency to resist. Clum to Smith.
June 17, 1875, ibid., (n. f.).
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The removal of the Coyoteros, although official, was far
from complete. Less than half of them were actually removed, and recent developments at Washington threatened
to undo all the work that had been done. Agent Clum must
have had an inkling of the trouble, for hastening to Tucson,
he wired the comissioner of the removal, and requested that
the Coyoteros be left in his hands to save disorganization
and dissatisfactionY Nevertheless, he was quite surprised
to meet "Colonel" W. E. Morford, who had just arrived
from New York as agent for the Camp Apache Reservation.
Morford, it developed, had been appointed through the
vagaries of politics on July 2, only two weeks after Clum
had been ordered back to Arizona to move the Coyoteros
away from Camp Apache. 42 Clum was greatly humiliated
by this apparent lack of support and confidence on the part
of his superiors, but he determined to resist Morford's claim
to the position on the grounds that the position no longer
existed. Morford was therefore informed that the agency
buildings at Camp Apache had been destroyed by a fire
almost at the time the Indians were removed. 43
But Morford was not to be so easily baffled. He barraged the commissioner with telegrams and letters, and his
friend, Rufus Ingalls, quartermaster general of the army,
interceded for him. 44 As a result, the commissioner ordered
Clum to "turn over the Camp Apache Indians to Agent Mor41. Clum to Comm., Aug. 4, 1875, 1. 0., C 1014.
42. Smith to Morford, July 2, 1875, L. B. no. 124, PP. 537-539.
43. When the fire was discovered, evidence showed that the seven buildings had
been fired simultaneously. It was also observed that L. C. Jenkins, the sub-agent, and
his party left for ,San Carlos about time the buildings started to burn. Lt. C. W. Bailey
to Ogilby, Aug. 14, 1875, A. G. 0., 4730.
A communication signed uJenks,'" and in Jenkins handwriting was pic~d up and
sent to the commanding general. It apparently compromised Jenkins and Clum, carry..
ing the news that the Coyoteros interpreted the "burning rightly," as' "the death of
affairs connected with them and a change of base." It also said, "Now that we have
conquered . . . I will father all that is done that you do not want to ..." Kautz to
A. A. G., Aug. 14, 1875, ibid. In 1877, Clum admitted that the "useless buildings" were
destroyed. Clum to Smith, July 21, 1877, 1. D.
44. Morford to Ingalls, Aug. 5, 1875, 1. 0., M 666; Morford to Smith, Aug. 9,
1875, I. 0., M 724; 'Morford to Smith, Aug. 10, 1875, 1. 0., M 662.
In these communications, Morford said that Clum while at Washington learned
about the probability of his appointment, and that he should have protested then.
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ford. There is no other way for the present." 45 As soon as
the two agents reached San Carlos, Morford learned that
nine hundred Indians were still at Camp Apache. He instantly decided to establish himself at that point, but Clum
now refused to transfer the Indians, saying his instructions
only required -the transfer of the remaining agency prop,..
erty.46 In the next move, when Morford suggested that the
reservation be again divided into two jurisdictions, the commissioner compromised, telling Morford to complete the
removal and then take charge, but to leave Clum in control
during the interim.H
'
But Morford, with ideas of his own, went on to Fort
Apache, formed an alliance with the military, and opened an
agency, And again the fight over removal was, reopened,
perhaps with more vehemence than before. Morford reported that affairs were in great confusion with two-thirds
of the Indians unremoved, and many returning from San
Carlos. Charging Clum with deceit and falsity, he said the
only reason removal had been attempted was to displace the
contractors of New Mexico with those of Tucson and San
Francisco.48 Such a verbal barrage appears to have left
Clum nonplussed for a time, 'but Inspector Kemble came to
his defense by declaring Morford insincere, insubordinate
and untrustworthy; and he 'characterized Morford's argument of Fort Apache being a better home for the Coyoteros
than San Carlos, as a "weak echo" of the military.49
45. Smith to Clum, Aug. 14, 1875, ibid.
46. Morford to Smith, Aug. 12, 1875, 1. 0., M 682.
Clum's refusal to transfer the Indians would indicate that he actually had received
the commissioner's earlier instructio·ns regarding Morford's appointment. For in..
structions, see, 'Smith to Clum, July 2, 1875, L. B. no. 124, p. 537.
47. Smith to Morford, Aug. 30, 1875, ibid., p. 218. Both of the agents were to
execute the order Ufaithfully in spirit as well as in letter."
48. Morford to Smith, Aug. 19, 1875, 1. 0., (n. f.) ; Clum to Smith, Aug. 23,
1875, 1. 0., C 1049; Morford to Ingalls, Oct. 12, 1875, I. D.
Clum reported that two hundred Coyoteros were allowed to return to Camp Apache
to gather corn. Arizona Citizen, Oct. 2, 1775.
'
49. E. C. Kemble to Smith, Jan. 18, 1876, 1. F., 719.
Clum also received strong support from the Arizo"", Citizen. No doubt his belief
that removal would divert the Indian trade from New Mexico to Arizona, "where it
properly belongs," was the deciding factor in his gaining this aid. Clum to Comm.,
Sept. I, 1875, op. cit., p.' 218. In addition to publishing his news reports, the paper
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The military, of course, seized the opportunity to aid
Morford, hoping thereby to undo Clum's work by preventing the completion of his removal plans. They advanced
arguments to show that his success was merely the fruition
of their own early efforts and that their help would be necessary to continue it, but that after all, no harmony could be
expected unless the department of the interior sent out an
agent of a more docile type.. Moreover, the new department
.commander insisted that a continuation of the concentration plan would necessitate the building· of an expensive
four-company post at San Carlos it' control were to be retained over so many diverse hands. 50 In this view he was
supported by General Schofield, who now said that, although
he had formerly been in favor of civil control, the present
predicament convinced him that the Indian bureau should be
turned over to the department of war so the purer servr~e
of the military could eliminate the graft of the civil officeh.
While he was willing to carry out the peace policy, he .declared his troops would not be allowed to war against
"peaceable Indians upon the demand of an Indian Agent." 51
In the meantime, Agent Morford conducted his pseudoagency on an independent basis with aid and supplies furnished by the military. Evidently everything worked to his
ends, for the chiefs, representing 1,003 Coyoteros, soon informed him that they would make their bands self-sufficient
within six years if allowed .to remain where they were. Fortified with this proposal, he informed the commissioner the
agency should be rebuilt at Camp Apache to avoid the desperate resistance sure to follow any attempt at removal. 52
50. Gen. August V. Kautz to A. A. G., Aug. 31, 1875, 44 Cong., 1 sess., H. E. D.
no. I, vol. ii, p. 133; Kautz to A. A. G., (n. d.), A. G. 0., 1834. Kautz had assumed
command on Mar. 22, 1875, when Crook was transferred to the department of the
Platte.
51. Sehofield to A. G., Sept. 20, 1875, 44 Cong., 1 sess., H. E. D. no. I, vol. ii,
p. 122; Sehofield to A. G., Jan. 5, 1875. A. G. 0., 804.
52. Morford to Smith, Sept. 6, 1875, 1. 0., M. 768.
began to earry praiseworthy artieles about his administrative polieies. The editor
also wrote the commissioner numerous personal letters in his support. Wasson to
Smith, Aug. 12,1875,1. 0., W 1426; Wasson to Smith, Aug. 26, 1875,1. 0., (n. f.).
See also, Smith to Gov. Safford, Oet. 18, 1875, in ArizO'na Citizen., Oet. 30, 1875.
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The commissioner, however, detected the intrigue and wired
him immediately, that a continuance of his perversity would
necessitate the abolition of his office. 53 But Morford now
hewed to the letter of his orders and asked for military' aid
to remove the 1,400 Coyoteros who he thought would not go
in peace; this, as expected, the military refused to furnish. 54
Within a short time, when it became obvious that the agent
was resisting removal to keep his son in as his chief clerk and
to get his .daughter appointed. as teacher, the department of
the interior acted, and by order of the president, the Camp
Apache Agency was discontinued, and the Indians placed in
.
charge of the San Carlos agent. 55
Nevertl).eless, Morford was not done. In an apologetic
letter he explained how his troubles had largely resulted
from a confusion of instructions; and also, how easily the,
Indians could be removed to San Carlos if they were.allowed
to remain at Camp Apache until cold weather made them
"tractable as lambs." More important, M:0rford had political
influence. This was soon shown when the commissioner not
only informed him his letters explained everything, but also
appointed him as agent to fill a'. vacancy at the Colorado River
Reservation. 56
During this time there had been other developments of
note. In September, Agent Clum in reply to a questionnaire
which really suggested the answer, boldly stated to the board
. of Indian commissioners that an Indian police force entirely
superseded the necessity of the military on a reservation. 57
Naturally, General Kautz was moved to action by this show
of hostility emanating from men in high positions of honor
and trust. He knew that the Clum-Morford fight had left the
63. Smith to Morford. Sept. 7, 1875, L. B. no. 126, p. 277.
54. Morford to Ogilby, Sept. 10, 1875. I. 0., M 83; Ogilby to Morford, Sept. 11,
1875, ibid.
55. Morford to Smith, Sept. 16, 1875, I. 0 .• M 863; Acting Secty. to Comm., Sept•
. 22, 1875, I. 0 .• I 1251.
.
56. Morford to Smith. Oct. 2. 1876. I. 0., M 948; Smith to Morford. (n. d.),
L. B. no. 126. p. 624. The commissioner deleted the "Morford Affair" from CIum's
annual report for 1875. See R. C. 1. A., 1875, p. 218.
67. Clum to Bd. of Ind. Comms., Sept. 18. 1875, R. B. 1. C., 1875, p. 95.
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Indians throughout the reservation more insubordinate and
unsettled than at any time since Clum took charge; there-fore, he seized the opportunity to ask the agent if he wished
the troops removed from San· Carlos. If Clum refused, he
would open himself to' ridicule; if he agreed, the general
hoped that subsequent events would require the recall of the
troops and thereby prove the inefficacy of civil control. But
the troops were removed on October 27 at the agent's request, and· thus for the first time he had an opportunity to
conduct a program of purely civil control at his main
agency.58
This concession, however, did not apply to the Camp
Apache Reservation from which several hundred Indians
. were yet to be removed. Clum knew that as long as' Kautz
retained the forty Indian scouts in his service, it would be
impossible to remove at least two hundred other Indians who
were members of their families. He therefore requested
Kautz to discharge them. In refusing to comply, Kautz expressed his fear that the agent would soon lose control of the
Indians, whereupon, the military would again need the services of the scouts. Kautz also told Clum that the retention
of the scouts would not prevent a complete removal of the
others if they were "not opposed to removal" and that if fivesixths of them were already removed, as reported, then the
removal was practically effected. But he agreed to discharge
certain chiefs who might facilitate the work. 59
When Clum went to Camp Apache a few days later to
close' the agency, he made no especial efforts to bring the
remaining Coyoteros to the Gila, but he reported that they
had sold their crops and were returning to San Carlos. 60
This visit evidently convinced Kautz that Clum was
58. Lt. G. S. Anderson to Clum, Oct. 9, 1875, I. F., 1660: Clum to Kautz, Oct. 9,
1875, ibid.
Clum's bitter letter (Clum to Editor, Sept. I, 1875, in Arizona Citizen, Sept~ 18,
1875) against the military also influenced Kautz to make the concession. Kautz to
Babcock, Oct. 20, 1875. op. cit.
59. Clum to Kautz, Oct. 9, 1875, I. F., 1660; A. A. G. to Clum, Oct. 19, 1875,
I. F.; 713.
60. Clum to Smith, Oct. 16, 1875, 1. 0., (n. f.).
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about to be successful, for he again took up the cause· against
removal, this time directly to President Grant. Informing
General Babcock, the president's secretary, that he anticipated trouble "if the present Indian Policy is carried out,"
he struck at the commissioner's action in breaking Howard's
promi~e as "not accidental but premeditated." Concentration, he believed; was unwise in a thinly populated region like
the Southwest, but if persisted in, it should take place in the
isolated White Mountain country instead of the valuable and
accessible region near San Carlos which he felt would soon
by encroached upon by miners and settlers. When this'
should occur, he predicted it would necessitate the presence
of several companies to preserve peace, as well as the maintenance of posts at Verde, Apache and Grant to command
"the country to which the disco,ntented Indians' will flee."
Furthermore, he was sure that Tucson and California contractors were engineering the removal because they found it
impossible to compete with New Mexican contractors in
supplying Camp Apache. Not half of the Indians had actually been removed, he said, and none wished to live at San
Carlos, except one band that'wished to be near their kinsmen, the troublesome Chiricahuas. Basing his final conclusion on the crops the Coyoteros had raised at Camp Apache
during the summer, he predicted they would soon be selfsustaining if allowed to remain. 61 No official instructions
came back to him, but it is very probable that his communications aroused enough sympathy in high circles to prevent
the consummation Of a complete removal.
The Indian Bureau, still convinced that military opposition was 'the sO,le cause for the Indians' failure to remove,
now sent ,Inspector Kemble to investigate. He reached Camp
Apache the last of November, just a short time after the
scout company had been re-enlisted. A careful check of the
seven bands revealed that although 881 Indians had not
removed, a considerable number were on their way to San
61. Kautz to Babcock, Oct. 20, 1875, op. cit. Kautz sent a similar report to
division headquarters. Kautz to A. A. G., Oct. 20, 1875, A. G. 0., 5770.
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Carlos. All the others would go, he believed, if the military
did not interfere, with the exception of nearly three hundred,
who would never remove until the scouts were dismissed.
The imprudence of Clum and the schemes of the army officers at Fort Apache, he maintained, had produced a civilmilitary impasse that would have to be settled at Washington. 62
It was evident by this time that the civil-military conflict had greatly retarded the agent's civilization program;
yet, despite impediments, substantial improvement had been
made. To civilize Indians, Clum felt they should do regular
work, engage in agriculture and help to enforce their own
discipline. Fortunately, his building program, the necessity
of clearing new land, preparing it for irrigation, and the
digging of the requir~d ditches, furnished a vast amount of
work, and this gave him an opportunity to provide his Indians with an incentive to work. He paid them fifty cents a
day in script of different denominations, redeemable at the
agency in annuity goods. As the Indians received much
greater quantities of goods than could be bought at the
Indian trader's store at the same cost, Clum usually had
more Indians willing to work than he could employ.63
The Indian work in agriculture was especially satisfactory during the year, although the agent failed to increase
the amount of land under cultivation over that of 1874. But
a virtual increase resulted, for after two hundred acres of
early crops were· harvested, one hundred and seventy-five
acres of corn were planted as a second crop. Disalin and
Eskiniinzin took their bands to spots somewhat removed
from the agency, cleared and irrigated new land, and began
farming on a private basis with commendable success. In his
annual report the commissioner enthusiastically reported
that the San Carlos Indians had harvested 625 bushels of
62. Kemble to Smith, Dec. 1, 1875, Jan. 3, 5, 7, 1876, I. F., 713.
Wnen the Indians came to San Carlos and in exactly what numbers, remains indefinite. After the chiefs were dismissed, Clum said "the Indians were gradually
brought to San Carlos." (Clum to Comm.• Oct. (?), 1876, R. C. I. A., P. 10.)" The·
Arizona Citizen, Feb. 12, 1876, reported that 1600 were removed.
63. Clum to Comm., Sept. 1, 1875, R. C. I. A., 1875. P. 220.
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wheat, 2,000 bushels of corn, 625 bushels of. barley and
9,200 bushels of potatoes. As the agency paid cash for much
of the grain raised, many of the Indians became eager for
small individual farms. 64
Clum's greatest success during the same period was in
the field of order and discipline, and his ability to maintain
and enforce these was, no doubt, the most important factor
in his success as an Indian agent. Believing that Indians
should be "compelled to control themselves" through their
own officers, he appointed a small police force at-the time of
his arrival. Later, when the Verdes were brought to San
Carlos, he increased his force to eight, and when the Indians
at Camp Apache were placed in his charge, he increased the
number of twenty-five. Armed with the latest type Springfield needle guns, they effectually maintained order among
the bands, enforced prohibition, arrested white iQ.truders
and upheld the authority of the agent. Much of their success was due to their captain; Clay Beauford, who had seen
several years experience as scout and guide in the Indian
country. Clum believed that in return for subsistence and
protection his Indians should readily submit to regulations
that were "neither numerous nor unreasonable." This view
was soon law on the reservation, and from then on every
symptom of insubordination was "speedily controlled and
suppressed." When he encountered the opposition of the
military, he asked for the removal of the troops, insisting
that the effectiveness of his policy guaranteed the safety
of the reservation. Even after the troops had been removed
and special emergencies had required the appointment of
additional temporary police, he still insisted his police were
superior to the troops as disciplinarians. Evidently he was
correct, for nearly all visitors and travellers to San Carlos
reported the law and order of the reservation fully equal to
that found in any civilized community on the frontier. 65
64. Clum to Comm., Sept. 1, 1875, op. cit., p. 218; Smith to Secty., Nov. 1, 1875,
R.• C. 1. A., 1875, p. 187.
65. Arizona Citizen, June 26, 1875; Clum to Smith, July 31, 1875, 1. D., Clum to
Comm., Sept. I, 1875, R. C. 1. A., 1875, p. 215. See also, John P. Clum, "Victorio," in

FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES

231

When Inspector Kemble visited the reserve in December, 1875, he was amazed by the cheerfulness, obedience and
satisfaction evident among the bands. To him this was not,
only a complete vindication of Clum's administration but
also a sound example of the constructive nature of the peace
policy. A bit of criticism could not be avoided, however, for
Clum at times had assumed authority at the expense of the
more orthodox methods. Some of his disbursements were
unauthorized, and he had paid a teacher who only nominally
fulfilled the office. There were inaccurate records as well as
deficiencies in certain supplies. The inspector also regretted
that Clum had sought the press. Nevertheless, he recommended strong moral and financial support to prevent the
agent from resigning. 66
For several months after the winter inspection the even
course of events at San Carlos was characterized by the
agent as a period of "peace and good fellowship."67 No difficulties developed, and the Indians continued to work industriously. They were greatly encouraged in January by the
distribution of 4,000 sheep which the commissioner hoped
would tend to check their nomadism. 68
Near the end of February, the agent again tested his
police when he sent fifteen of them under Captain Beauford
to run down a band of renegades in the Tonto Basin. Their
success was complete, and after killing sixteen, they returned
with twenty-two captives. 69
Regardless of the success of his administration, Clum
66.

Kemble to Smith, Jan. 5, 1876, I. F., 713.
The agent's brother, G. A. Clum, conducted a school for a few weeks during the
summer. Clum to Smith, Oct. I, 1875, I. 0., C 1333; G. A. Clum, "Our Advent into the
Great Southwest:~ Arizona Historical Review, Oct. 1929, pp. 83-84.
67. Clum, Apache Agent, p. 170.
68. Clum to Comm., Oct. (1), 1876, R. C. I. A., 1876, p. 12.
69. Clum to Comm., Mar. 18, 1876, I. 0., C 247.

1929), 114;

N. Me",. Hist. Rev., iv (Apr.,
Clum. "The San Carlos Apache Police,"
ibid., iv (July,
H. E. Dunlap, "Clay Beauford-Welford C. Bridwell,"
Ariz. Hist. Rev., Oct.,
p. 14 et seq.
The reliability of the police was put to a severe test in December when Chief
Disalin tried to kill the whites at the agency. The police did their duty without orders,
and Disalin fell dead pierced by several .bullets, some of them fired' by Tauelc1yse, his
brother. Clum to Kemble, Dec.
I. F., 720.

1929), 203-210;
1930,

21, 1875,
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was still disheartened over the Morford affair. He also feared
that the "injudicious economy" of the Bureau threatened his
future work. Thus, somewhat disgruntled, he resigned on
February 26, and a month later the commissioner decided to
release him as soon as a successor could be named. 70 But a
slidden outbreak of the Chiricahuas disrupted the plans, and
instead of being relieved Clum was asked to remove the tribe
to San Carlos. It will therefore be necessary to review the
Chiricahuan affairs during the year preceding the outbreak.
During 1874 the Chiricahuas had remained peaceable,
but they had made little progress towards civilization. Nevertheless, Inspector Daniels preferred Jeffords' loose civil
control to the military management he had witnessed elsewhere,71 Jeffords in dealing with Indians was essentially a
realist, and as such he refrained from any innovations that
might drive. his suspicious charges from their reserve. He
maintained order with his personal influence, but reliance
was also placed on a small police force whose personnel he
frequently changed. By this scheme he attempted to avoid
the development of factions. 72 His Indians were allowed to
keep their arms arid ponies, and they enjoyed perfect liberty
to go where they wished. The counts were as irregular as
the issues were unsystematic, for the clerk, convinced that
he knew every face and the number in each family, dealt out
rations "with a rapidity and a power of ready reckoning
that surpassed the lightning calculator." 73
Visitors from other reserves were a great. source of
worry to the agent, and on the average he rationed two hundred of them per month. This was done in an attempt to prevent them from leading his young men away on raids. Frequently, however, the visitors merely passed through the reserve with their plunder, but in any case aIL the depredations
were attributed to the Chiricahuas. Although the worst
70. Secty. of Interior to Comm., Mar. 18, 1876, 1. 0., I 278; Clum to Comm.,
Mar. 25, 1876, 1. 0., C 335.
71. Cf. supra, p. 204, et seq.
72. Jeffords to Bd. of Ind. Comms., Sept. 11, 1875, R. B. I. C., 1875, p. 93.
73. Kemble to Smith, Dec. 30, 1875, I. F., 718.

FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES

233

offenders came from the Warm Springs Reservation, the
Coyoteros from San Carlos also caused complications. In
fact, after their removal from Fort Apache, over two hundred were reported in the vicinity of Fort Bowie. These
visitors frequently had passes "to gather their crops" but
many of them claimed they could not live at San Carlos because of feuds among the bands. Their visitations continued
until December, when a series of tiswin fights resulted in the
death of a prominent Chiricahua. After this the vengeance
of the aggrieved tribe acted as a powerful deterrent against
the use of their reservation as a refuge for the disaffected
I
ones. 74
That raiding into Mexico was greatly diminished during 1875 is shown by the paucity of complaints from Mexican officials. Some raiding went on, however, but most of
it was doubtless done by Indians other than the Chiricahuas.
One G. H. Howard, who travelled through Sonora in April,
reported that the constant raids had so alarmed the citizens_
that they had abandoned many of their mines and much of
their agricultural land. As he left Sonora, he followed the
outgoing trail of a band of forty raiders almost to the Chiricahua agency.75
H. C. Hodge, an important observer of the time, after
visiting the Chiricahuas, also reported numerous raids, but
he concluded that the raiders consisted of portions of the
Chiricahua bands that made Mexico their home. He believed that they frequently escaped danger by fleeing to the
Chiricahua Reservation where they sold and traded their
stolen property to Jeffords' Indians. 76
In July, the prefect of Magdalena charged that a large
number of mules had been taken to the Chiricahua Reservation. Jeffords failed to locate them and attributed this and
other thefts to visiting Indians. But he admitted that he had
some men who could not be held in check and who joined the
74.
Oct. 20,
75.
76.

Jeffords to Comm., Aug. 21. 1875, R. C. I. A., 1875, p. 711; Kautz to Babcock,
1875, op. cit.: Jeffords ta Carom., Oct. 3, 1876, R. C. I. A., 1876, p. 407.
Howard to Wasson, April 29, 1875, in Arizona Citizen, May 8, 1875.
Hodge to Wasson, May 10, 1875; Arizona Citizen," May 22, 1875.
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raiders. General Kautz tersely insisted that most of the
raiders were Chiricahuas who raided undetected because of
Jeffords' imperfect counts. He believed that a rigid system
of counting would end the devastations. 77
Jeffords might have inaugurated a more rigid system of
control, <but after Cochise's death he could find no Indian
with sufficient leadership to be of much help. Without such
aid, he believed any attempt at rigidity would be followed by
an outbreak in which the frontier would be ravished. Nevertheless, he exerted himself strenuously to help the Indians
while he protected the interests of the whites. His success in
restoring stolen animals to their rightful, owners won the
acclaim of the citizens; moreover, it acted as an effective
check against the Indians bartering in them. But a new
problem arose: a great :many freighting and' immigrant
parties passed through the Apache Pass, which was within
easy access of the agency at' Pinery Canyon, and here the
more restless bucks soon learned that the travellers were
only too willing to trade whiskey for horses. Jeffords perceived at once that the trade would have to be checked if
raids on both American and' Mexican ranches were to be
prevented. He, therefore, asked permission to move his
agency to Apache Pass where he could exercise proper surveillance. 78
Commissioner Smith, however, was now fully convinced
that the Chiricahuas should be removed to Hot Springs
where their management would be more economical and
"vastly simplified." 79
He accordingly directed Superintendent Dudley to gain
77. Placido R. Aragon to Gov. of Ariz•• July 27. 1875, Arizona Citize.... Aug. 21.,
1875'; Jeffords, to Comm.• Aug. 21. 1875. 011. cit.• p. 712; Kautz to A. A. G.• Aug. 81.
1875. op. cit.• P. 132.
78. Jeffords to Smith, Jan. 2, 1875. 1. 0 .• J 89; Arizo...a Citize.... Jan. 16. Mar. 6.
1875; Jeffords to Bd. Ind. Comms.• Nov. 27, 1875. R. B. I. C.• 1875, p. 103.
79. Smith to Delano, Nov. 1, 1874, 43 Congo 2 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. i, p. 62.
, No doubt he was partly influenced to makie this decision by Delegate Elkins, Governor,Giddings and Superintendent Dudley of New Mexico. These politicians worked for
this removal in o'rder to benefit New' Mexican contractors. See, Dudley to Elkins,
April 14, 1874, I. 0., E 50; Giddings to Dudley, April 14, 1874, I. 0., D 425; Smith to
Dudley, April 15, 1874, L. B. no. 118. P. 43. '
,
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their consent. 80 Dudley counseled with them on April 16,
and again the Indians threatened war if· molested. The
commissioner then relented and allowed Jeffords to establish
himself at Apache Pass. 81 Apparently this move solved the
difficulty, for the Indians committed no outrages during the
summer. They remained obedient and well behaved, but
they made no advance towards civilization. In fact, their
inferiority in the arts prevented the agent from sending any
collection to the Centennial Committee. When Inspector
Kemble made his winter visit, he saw little hope for their
progress as long as they remained under Jeffords' control.
A different agent, he believed, might disarm and prepare
them for removal to a betterplace. 82
Up to this time, Jeffords had kept his Indians well rationed, but so many visitors had drawn from his supplies
that he faced a shortage. Besides, the Bureau had cut his
beef quota from 889,000 pounds to 650,000 pounds. 83 In February the beef supply became so scanty that he allowed some
of his bands to move to the Dragoon Mountains to hunt for
game; Within a short ti:rl1e a quarrel arose among them resuIting in the killing of three Indians, one of whom was a
grandson of Cochise. Chief Tahzay returned imrllediately to
the agency with most. of the Indians, but Skinyea, with
twelve men and their families remained in the Dragoons.!f4
In March, a few men from this party joined some Coyoteros on a raid into Sonora and returned with $100 in precious metals.. Soon they obtained whiskey from one Rogers
,who owned a trading post on the reservation, and Pionsenay,
a brother of Skinyea, .while inebriated, killed his two sisters.
A few days later he did penance by killing Rogers and a
cook named Spence. When other restless bucks joined with
him, a series of devastations followed in the San P,edro
80. Smith to Dudley, Dec. 19, 1874; L. B. no; 122, P. ·106•.
81. Jeffords to Comm., Aug. 21, 1875, op. cit.
82. Jeffords to Comm., Dec. 17, 1875, 1. 0., J. 1; Kemble to Smith. Dec. 30, 1875,
1. F. 718.
83. Jeffords to Smith, Jan. 19, 1876, I. 0., J 122.
84. M. J. O'Brien to Safford, April 21, 1876, I. 0., M 297; Jeffords to Smith,
April 27, 1876, 1. 0., J 476.
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Valley, culminating in the murder of two prominent ranchmen. 85 These events frightened all the Chiricahuas and a
general outbreak was threatened, especially when troops
from Fort Bowie pursued the marauders into the San Jose
Mountains. Jeffords and Tahzay, however, by assuring the
bands that no punitive action was intended against peaceable
Indians, quieted them sufficiently to prevent a catastrophe.
During the next m,onth the innocent Indians under Skinyea
were allowed to come in while Pionsenay, undisturbed by
. the military, was allowed to move nearer the agency into the
Chiricahua Mountains. 86
'
In the meantime, events moved rapidly elsewhere, for
Governor Safford and the Arizona Citizen had already begun
a terrible tirade against Jeffords and the Chiricahuas. 87
Safford, on April 19 wired John Wasson at Washington
that the reserve should be abandoned and the Indians moved
to San Carlos or Hot Springs and that no one but Agent
Clum had the "nerve, ability and confidence to do it. H88
Washington officials were evidently alarmed over the situation, for the next day Congress provided· funds for the removal. On May 3, Clum was ordered to suspend Jeffords,
and if "practicable" to remove the Chiricahuas to San
Carlos. 89 He refused to act, however, until a sufficient military force was in the field for any emergency. After a delay
of three weeks iIi which pressure was placed on the war department, General Kautz personally moved into the field
with twelve ,companies of cavalry and two of Indian scouts. 90
85. Jeffords to Smith. May 12. 1876, I. 0., J 524.
86. Jeffords to Comm., Oct. 3, 1876, R. C. I. A., 1876, pp. 407-408.
87. " •.. the kind of war needed for the Chiricahua Apaches, is steady unrelenting,
hopeless, and undiscriminating war, slaying men, women and children, .... until every
valley and crest and crag and fastness shall send to high heaven the grateful incense
of festering and.rotting Chiricahuas.'· Arizona Citiztm, April 15, 1876. See also issues
of May 20, 1876, and Mar. 24, 1877.
88. Safford to Wasson, April 19, 1876, I. 0., W 467. Clum had already talked to
Safford and offered the services of 235 San Carlos special police. Clum to Safford, April
14, 1876, I. 0" C 388.
89. Smith to Clum, May 3, 1876, L. B. no. 183, p. 92.
90. Safford to Smith, May 6, 1876, I. 0., S 351; Sherman to Schofield. May 22,
1876, I. 0., W 571; Kautz to Secty. of War, Sept. 15, 1876, 44 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D.
no. 1, vol. ii, p. 98.
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At Clum's request he agreed to move his force near the
reservation. 91 When the troops and Clum with his bodyguard of fifty-four Indian police approached the reserve on
June 4, the Chiricahuas realized that a crisis had arrived in
their affairs. That night a council was held to decide the
question of war or peace. Skinyea and Pionsenay were
unable to prevail against the peaceable counsels of Tahzay
and his brother Nachee, and a purge of the war leaders followed in which Skinyea and five of his leading men were
killed;92
The next day when Clum reached the agency, the chiefs
and headmen readily consented to removal. Another closely
related band reputed to belong in Mexico, and led by Geronimo, Juh and Nolgee; also wanted to be included in the
removal. Clum agreed, and gave the chiefs three days in
which to collect their followers. But the astute chiefs merely
wanted time to effect their escape. They therefore fled head- .
long with their bands across the border into the Sierra
Madre, safely eluding the strong force of cavalry that pursued them. 93
On June 12, three hundred and twenty-five Chiricahuas
were started to Sari Carlos, where they arrived and were
safely located six days later. Thus, in Glum's over-sanguine
words: "The terrible shade of that tribe's dreaded name had
passed away, and the imaginary army of four or five hundred formidable warriors had dwindled to the modest number of sixty half-armed and less clothed savages." 94
91. Clum to Kautz. June 8. 1876. I. 0 .• C 540.
92. Jeffords to Smith. June 5, 1876. I. 0 .• J 587. Pionsenay. though seriously
wounded, escaped. He was arrested four days later. but shortly· after Clum turned him
over to the territorial officers. he again escaped. For this and ·other details,· see. Clum,
"Geronimo," N. Me",. Hist. Rev., iii (Jan.• 1928), pp. 8 at seq.
93. Jeffords to Comm.• Oct. 3, 1876, op. cit.
94. Clum to Comm., Oct. (1), 1876, op. cit., p. 10.
The ';umber that evaded removal was never satisfactorily determined. Clum
thought that about one hundred went to Sonora and Hot Springs. Clum to Comm.,
Oct. (1), 1876, op. cit. Jeffords, however. insisted that 140 went to Hot Springs and
that 400 continued to roam at large. Jeffords to Comm., Oct. S, 1876, op.· cit. General
Kautz believed that Jeffords overestimated the number to protect himself from charges
of graft in raiioning. He also thought that the Indians refused exact counts to appear
more formidable by an exaggeration of their numbers. Kautz to A. A. G.• June· SO.
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The supervision of the Chiricahua Reservation was
transferred to General Kautz on June 13, with the request
that he treat as hostile any Indians found thereon. 95 No devastations occurred for a month, but on July 14, the murder
of two miners near Forth Bowie brought orders for the
troops to run the murderers down. 96 Although ·they frequently found trails that led towards Mexico, they accomplished nothing. Within two months the toll had mounted
to twenty persoris killed and over one hundred .animals
stolen. In contrast to the impotent Arizona troops, those in
New Mexico trailed a band of Arizona marauders into the
Florida Mountains, fought them there, and killed twenty
bucks. 97 This inflamed the territorial officers against Kautz,
and despite the fact that he established a new post in the
troubled region,98 they attributed the continued devastations
to his inactivity. Safford asked the secretary of war for five
.hundred guns and threatened to call out the militia.99
The threat of competition stirred Kautz into action
again, and he ordered Captain T. C. Tupper with a command
of fifty cavalrymen, and a company of Indian scouts to scour
the region. After an extended search the -captain reported
the area the "safest country' against Indians that he had
ever scouted thr0l.;1gh." 100 Kautz now attributed the killings
to renegade whites from Mexico and suggested that prominent Arizonians exaggerated the disorders so more soldiers
would be sent to the region. 101 But when it was suggested
95. R. C. I. A., 1876, p. 396. The reservation
Executive Orders Relating to Indian Reservations, p. 6.
96. Kautz to A. A. G., Sept. 15, 1876, op. cit.

boundary lines.

was abolished. Oct. 80. 1876.
Officers were to disregard all

97. Arizona Citizen, Sept. 23, Oct. 7, 1876.
98. Camp Thomas was established Aug. 12, 1876, near the present Fort Thomas.
Arizona. Barnes, Arizona Place Names, p. 442.
99. Safford to Kautz, Sept. 25, 1876. in Arizona Citize... Sept. 30, 1876.
100. Kautz to A. A. G., Aug. 15, 1877, 45 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. I, vol. ii,
p.134.
101. A caustic battle was waged in the newspapers between Kautz and Safford in
the spring of 1877. See their letters in Arizona Citizen. Feb. 14, and Mar. 17, 1877.
Also, in Arizona Miner, Mar. 9, 1877.

1876, A. G. 0., 4028. During 1877, Safford charged that 200 were not removed because
of Kautz's negligence. Safford in Arizona Citizen. Feb. 17. 1877.
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that a change of commanders would bring results, Kautz
decided that recent thefts near Old Camp Crittenden were
real, and a vigorous scout under Lieutenant J. A. Rucker
followed. Rucker's command of fifty-two men and thirtyfour Indian scouts pursued the marauders' trail 230 miles
east into the Liedendorf Mountains of New Mexico. Here,
in a surprise attack on a sixteen-lodge village, they k.illed ten
hostiles and captured the Indians' property consisting of
forty-six horses and a large amount of supplies that had
come from the Chiricahua Reservation. The lieutenant reported the region overrun with hostiles.l0 2
Kautz now decided that the Chiricahuas were at large in
greater numbers than he at first supposed, and that they
were probably being reinforced by restless bucks from the·
Hot Springs Reservation. When Dr. Whitney, the acting
agent at Ojo Caliente, confirmed this view, Lieutenant Austin Henely was sent to the Rio Grande to investigate. l03
In the meantime, Arizona suffered a "reign of terror."
During the first half of February, fifteen men were killed
and over one hundred animals were stolen in the Sonoita
region alone. l04 Troops dispatched to the scene from Forts
Apache arid Bowie merely caused most of the hostiles to melt
away untouched into Sonora. One band, however, was intercepted by Lieutenant Rucker and pushed into New Mexico,
but despite the fact they made straight for Ojo Caliente, he
failed to overtake them.lOS
Naturally, such results further inflamed the already
seething citizens against the military, and Governor Safford, reflecting this attitude, wrote a scathing denunciation
of Kautz's tactics, charging that a continuation of his methods would require the services of the entire army for the
next twenty years to reduce the marauders. l06 Opposition
102.
captured.
103.
104.
105.
106.
expressed

Rucker to P. A., Jan. 14, 1877, A. G. 0., 1005.

A nephew of Geronimo was

Kautz to A. A. G., Aug. 15. op. cit., p. 135.
Arizona Citize.., Feb. 10, 17, 1877.
Rucker to P. A., Mar. 11, 1877, A. G. O. (n. f.).
Safford to editor, Mar. 17, 1877, in Arizona Citizen, Mar. 24, 1877. Kautz
himself in the Arizo.... Miner, see issue of Mar. 9, 1877. Kautz was con-

240

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW

against Kautz also took a more direct form when, on February 8, the legislature at the governor's request, appropriated
$10,000 to put a company of friendly Indian scouts into the
field 107 to be armed with rifles made available by order of the
secretary of war. 108 By the last of February, Captain Beauford with a command of forty-five scouts equipped to stay in
the field for two months, was out on the hunt of the hostiles.10 9
It was evident by this time that a great deal of the
troubles in Arizona was due to causes emanating f~om the
Hot Springs Reservation on the Rio Grande. Indeed, little
except failure had resulted since its reestablishment as a
reserve three years before,11° The change appears to have
satisfied the Indians,. but even though the agent received
.strong military support from Fort McRae,11l his reports for
1875, were pessimistic in tone. In language laudatory to his
effor.ts, he explained that as long as his charges received
plentiful rations they remained peaceable more from "selfinterest" than from any moral changes. Only a few, he said,
could be induced to farm and ditch, and he predicted the in.troduction of a regular system of labor would have to be
very gradual. In the case of liquor sellers and intruders he
found his control threatened ~t every hand, but he cautioned
the commissioner that his charges were too wild for the
creation of a police force,112
Even with these hazards the agent had no trouble during the winter of 1875-1876. Early the next spring, however,
he suddenly reported that a shortage of rations endangered
the peace of the region, and for that reason he requested permission to exchange his surplus sugar for extra flour and
107. Arizona Citizen, Feb. 10, 1877.
108. ATkona Citizen, Feb. 24, 1877.
109. IbU!. See N. Me",. HiBt. Rev., iii (Jan.,
plished nothing. ATkona Citizen, June 16, 1877.
110.

111.
112.

Cf. 8upTa, p.

1928), 12-26.

Tbe command accom.

207.

Special Orders no. 117, Nov. 11, 1875, A. G. 0., 4145.
J. M. Shaw to Smith, Sept. I, 1875, R. C. I. A., 1875, p.
Ind. Comms., Sept. 30. 1875, R. B. I. C., 1875, p. 96.

836;

Shaw to Bd.

vinced Safford was connected with Tucson contractors who wanted more .troops to
feed. Kautz to A. A. G., Aug. 15, 1877, op. cit., pp. 188-140.
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beef held by the military. The commissioner refused to
authorize such an irregular procedure, insinuating in his
refusal, that a new agent might be needed unless greater
economy was effected. Shaw immediately enlisted the aid
of Stephen B. Elkins, territorial delegate from New Mexico,
who appears to have used his influence in getting a suffici- .
ency of supplies for the reserve.H s
Nevertheless, some Indians did go out on raids, but
when a force of cavalry w~s placed west of the reserve ageneraI exodus was prevented. Even then the visiting with the
Chiricahuas was kept up, and number of young insubordinate Chiricahuas that came to Hot Springs to make their
permanent homes greatly increased the discipline problem
of the agent.H 4
.
In order to ascertain the exact condition of affairs at
Hot Springs,' Inspector Kemble scrutinized the agency in
May. The deplorable condition of affairs was reflected in the
outright graft that existed' in the issuance of supplies.
Where only 330 Indians had been rationed just before Shaw
took charge, 1,150-1,300 were now supposed to receive subsistence. The agent had neither counts nor issue tickets, but
he sent in grossly exaggerated false returns, and only onefourth of the hay issued was consumed by the animals at the
agency. The fact that government blankets could be found
in every home along the Rio Grande supported the report
that surplus supplies were exchanged for whiskey at Canada
Alamosa. Kemble believed that the 600-700 Indians actually
on the reservation were masters of the agent, controlling his
issues at their pleasure. For these reasons he suggested the
immediate removal of Shaw if a bloody outbreak were to be
avoided. 1l5
Despite the unfavorable outlook, the vigorous activity
of the New Mexican troops in connection with the Chiricahua outbreak prevented the Southern Apaches from exten-

a

lIS.
114.
115.

For correspondence, see, 44 Cong., 1 sess., S. M. D. no. 91.
Shaw to Comm., Sept. 1, 1876, R. C. I. A., 1876, p. 516.
Kemble to Comm., May 17, 1876, I. F., 783.
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~ive maraudering. Nevertheless, twenty animals were stolen
at the Clifton mines on one raid.. The situation looked much
worse, however, when about one hundred Chiricahuas under
Chief Gordo at the time their reserve was abolished took '
refuge at Hot Springs. ll6 On August 10, James Davis replaced Shaw as agent. Davis appears to have been a constructive agent, and he worked hard during his short term to
improve his charges' condition. He assured them a more
adequate food supply by replacing the issues of beef on hoof
which they usually bartered away, with beef on the block. He
also cut off their supply of corn, and thus reduced the source
of their whiskey. By the time Lieutenant Henely reached
the reservation on March 17; Davis had induced some of
them to start farming and ditching. ll7
. Lieutenant Henely arrived none too soon, however, for
he not only learned that the Warm Springs Indians were
joining the renegade Chiricahuas on their raids, but also
that many of the renegade· Chiricahuas were using Hot
Springs as a rendezvous for rest and rations. He was quite
surprised to find that Geronimo who had just returned with
one hundred stolen horses "was very indignant because he
could not draw rations for the time he was out." 118 No time
was lost in making1 a decision, for the department of the interior was thoroughly aroused over its failure to solve the
Chiricahua-Southern Apache problem. On March 20 the
commissioner wired Agent Clum to arrest and hold the renegades on charges of murder and robbery. He was to remove
them to San Carlos, and his police force was to aid in the
undertaking. 119
Clum hesitated for a short time, sent in his resignation,
and then proceeded with plans for removaJ.120 Governor Saf116. Gen. Hatch to A. A. G., July 14, 1876; I. D.; Kautz to A. A. G.• Sept. 16,
1876, op. cit., p. 99.
117. Davis to Comm., Aug. 10, 1877, 46 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. 1. vol. viii,
p.688.,
118. Safford to Comm., Mar. 18, 1877, I. 0., A 131; Kautz to A. A. G•• Aug. 16,
1877,'op. cit., p. 135.
.
119. Smith to Clum, Mar. 20, 1877, L. B. no. 132, p. 663. J. Q. Smith had recently
replaced Edward P. Smith as commissioner.
120. Clum, The Truth about the Apaches, p. 28 et seq,
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ford returned the Indian police to agency service, but General Kautz avoided cooperation, pointing out that the Indians were in the District of New Mexico. l21 General John
Pope, commanding the Division of the Missouri, ordered
General Edward Hatch to render full aid, and nine companies of troops were ordered to Hot Springs.122
Without delay, Clum with forty additional police joined
Captain Beauford's scouts at Silver City, and the combined
force of over one hundred men set out for the Rio Grande.
A march of four hundred miles brought the command on
April 20 to an obscure point within striking distance of the
reservation. Learning that Geronimo and his followers
were encamped near the agency, Clum took twenty-two
scouts and moved into Ojo Caliente to reconnoitre. Here he
learned the troops were two days away, and, fearing that a .
delay would hazard his plans, he decided to arrest the renegades forthwith. During the night Captain Beauford's
reserves were brought up and secreted in a large commissary
building near the main agency building. Early the next
morning Geronimo and the other chiefs came fora talk, convinced they could easily overawe the small force that had
arrived the evening before. Within a few minutes Geronimo's arrogant and bellicose attitude. brought the conference to an impasse. Calling on his hidden reserves,' Clum
was successful in taking into custody Geronimo, 'Gordo,
Ponce, Francisco and thirteen other noted renegade leaders.
Unfortunately, Pionsenay and Nolgee were away raiding in
Sonora and Arizona, and already reports of, their bloody
deeds had reached the agency. In the hope that these renegades might be intercepted, Captain Beauford and seventyfive ·of his scouts were ordered back to Arizona by way of
the Dos Cabezas Mountains. 123
121. Clum, "Geronimo." N. Me.,. Hist. Re"., iii (Jan., 1928). P. 27; Kautz to
Clum, Mar. 31, 1877, A. G. 0., 3063.
.
122. Clum to A. A. G.• April 2, 1877, A. G. 0 .• 2265; Pope to C. 0., April 8.
'.
1877, ibid.
123. Clum to Comm., Mar. 29, 1877, 1. 0., S 201; Clum to Mai. J. F. Wade, April
22, 1877, 1. 0., S 398; Clum to Editor, April 24, 1877, in Arizona Citize.... May 5, 1877:
Clum to Comm., Sept. 18, 1877, R. C. I. A., 1877, p. 32. '
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Now convinced that even more drastic changes were
needed, the commissioner ordered the removal of all the
Warm Springs Indians to San Carlos. 124 Victorio, the chief
of the Warm Springs Indians and his followers readily
assented to removal, and the first count showed a total of
434 Indians. At the next count the number had dropped to
175 due to a drunken spree which Clum learned had inclined
most of the tribe to wander away. Major James F. Wade,
however, by immediately making an energetic .demonstration so frightened the recalcitrants, that at the following
counts they were all present, unarmed and unmounted. 125
Within a week all arrangements for the removal were
completed. The war department ordered General Hatch to
cooperate throughout, and "more out of compliment than
necessity," Clum asked for a small escort entirely to San
Carlos. 126 On May 1, M. A. Sweeney with the aid of the escort started by trail-with 453 Indians, while Clum and his
police took the renegades in wagons and joined the cavalcade
at Silver City.127 From here the procession pushed on without incident, reaching San Carlos on May 20. The prisoners
were placed in the guardhouse, and the authorities notified,
124. Smith to Clum, April 17, 1877, L. B. no. 136, p. 77.
125. Clum to Wade, April 24, 1877, I. 0., S 398; Gen. Hatch to A. A. G., April
27, 1877, '\. G. 0., 2554.
126. Gen. Sherman to Gen. Sheridan, May 1, 1877, A •. G. 0., 2420; Clum to
Smith, July 28, 1877, op. cit.
A controversy over the escort followed. Hatch requested Kautz to relieve him at
the' Arizona-New Mexico line, but when an escort was proffered, Clum declined it,
wiring Kautz that "no escort has been asked from Arizona and ,none will be accepted!'
The war department considered this action a "breach of personal and official courtesy,"
and when' General Sherman endorsed the telegram, he strongly denounced Clum saying
he had no business" to refuse Kautz's escort. In explanation, Clum wrote that General Sherman had H no business" to interfere with "his business.'" This correspondence
is collected in, A. G. 0., 3063; also in Arizona Citizen, Aug. 18, 1877.
Clum no doubt, was incensed over Kautz's refusal to furnish an escort at the
beginning. Kautz explained, however, that Clum had refused to allow a recruiting
officer to enlist a company of scouts at San Carlos at the time the request was made
and that the delay that followed in getting Hualpai scouts prevented the sending of an
escort. Kautz to A,. G., April 12, 1877, A. G. O. 2308.
127. Clum to Comm., May I, 1877, 1. 0., S 369.
The reserve was transferred to' Major Wade with instructions to treat all remaining
Indians as hostiles. CIum to Wade, May I, 1877, I. 0., S 553. Population figures at
Hot Spring. were indefinite, but it is probable that nearly 200 avoided removal. See.
Whitney to Clum, April 23, 1877. ibid.
H
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but the main body of the Indians was given the sameprivileges which other San Carlos bands enjoyed. 128
Beiinning with the removal of the Chiricahuas and continuing up until his return with the Warm Springs Indians,
Clum's frequent and extended absences from San Carlos had
left him little time for agency management. Besides much
of his remaining time was consumed in· bitter controversies
with the military. After the Chiricahuas were satisfactorily
settled at San Carlos in June, 1876, no event of importance
disturbed the agency routine for the rest of the year. In
fact, affairs appeared so hopeful in July that the agent carried out a dramatic project he had long anticipated-that of
taking a group of Apaches to the East. 129
While Clum was in Washington, the commissioner persuaded him to withdraw his pending resignation on the promise of more pay, full support against the military and the
assignment of no duties that would require him to leave the
reservation. Thus reassured, he returned to his post, with
high hopes for the future. 130
But he was soon again embroiled with the military.
About March 1, 1877, three bucks killed an old Indian woman
near Fort Apache. No report was made of the affair, and a
little later when Clum heard the murderers had gone unscathed, he decided the military was deliberately shielding
them, thereby hoping to undermine his authority as agent.
Without hesitation he sent a company of scouts to the scene
to arrest the murderers or kill them. The scouts proceeded
as directed, and on March 11 killed one of the murderers, but
128. Clum to Comm., May 28, 1877, ibid.
For details of removal, see Clum, "Geronimo," N. MfW. Rist. Rev., iii (Jan., 1928),
PP. 26 et seq.; Clum, "Victorio," ibid., iv (Apr., 1929), pp. 107 et seq.; Clum, Apache
Agent, chapt~. xxviii-xxxiii.
129. Clum to Comm., Sept. 18, 1877, R. C. 1. A., 1877, p. 34.
The trip was partly finauced by "Wild Apache" shows in the larger cities along the
route. Unfortunately, Chief Tahzay died at Washington. He was buried in the Congressional Cemetery. After visiting the Centennial Exposition, the Indians were conducted back to the reserve by Marijildo Grijalba, the interpreter. Clum th~n took a
sixty days leave, returning to San Carlos January 1. See, Apache Agent, pp. 185, et
seq.; Clum, "Apaches as Thespians in'1876," N. Me.,. Hist. Rev., vi (Jan., 1930), pp.
76-99.
130. Clum, The Truth About the Apaches, P. 29.
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in doing so fired upon an Indian soldier. Major Ogilby now
sent out a detachment of troops and chased the police a long
distance, disregarding the fact that they were within the
limits of the Indian reservation.I 31
Chim immediately reported Major Ogilby's conduct to
General Kautz, charging also that the military kept the favor
of the few Indians remaining at Camp Apache with liquor,
guns and ammunition. He furthermore asked that Major
W. S. Worth be court-martialed for buying an Apache squaw
from her relatives and forcing her to remain in his quarters. 132
General Kautz countercharged that Clum's "raid" was
merely an attempt to drive the non-combatants of Chief"
Pedro's band to San Carlos while Pedro's men were away
scouting against renegade Chiricahuas. Declaring that
Clum's actions had created a very dangerous situation at
Fort Apache, Kautz ordered the scouts back to the post. 133
Clum retorted that Kautz was guilty of "criminal inactivity"
in leaving southern Arizona exposed to the renegades; nevertheless he had the satisfaction of getting Captain Worth's
conduct investigated. 134
While this imbroglio was taking place, Clum learned
that General Kautz had already made gross insinuations
against his management at San Carlos, but he did not know
that the adjutant general had been notified on February 12,
that many unreported renegades had strayed away because
of bad treatment and lack of food and that the resultant
saving of rations probably accrued to "those who issue
them." 135 When he heard of these latter charges, he was
131. Clum to Marijildo Griialba, Mar. 7, 1877, I. F., 1660; Clum to A. A. G.,
Mar. 17, 1877, ibid.
132. Ibid.
133. Kautz to A. G., April 12, 1877, A. G. 0., 2308.
. 134. Clum to Comm., April 21, 1877, I. 0., S 360.
The court of inquiry practically exonerated Worth. Clum, however, was accused
of preferring charges against Worth in an effort to draw attention from his agency
mismanagement. Kautz to Comm., June 7, 1877, I. 0., K 183.
135. Kautz to A. G., Feb. 12, 1877, A. G. 0., 1190. Kaut:< also wrote that most
of the troop's labors were "provided by the inability or inefficiency, tq say nothing of
the reputed criminality of the agents . . ." Kautz's letter was published in the Arizo....
Citizen, May 19, 1877, at Clum's request.
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just ready to start for Hot Springs to arrest the renegades.
At first he threatened to quit, but when the commissioner
promised an investigation, he went on with his taskyi6 As
no formal charges were sent to the interior department, the
commissioner directed Inspector Vandever, who was on his
way tothe agency, to review the case. In due time Vandever
reported the charges of Kautz as strictly "vague and malicious." 137
But Clum did not let the matter rest. Assailing Kautz
through the press, he violated rules of common courtesy by
publishing answers to the general's official communication of
February 12. His answers took the form of a diatribe
against the general's entire administration of the Department of Arizona by comparing the activity and success of
the troops with that of the agency police. Evidence was arranged to show that the police had killed and captured 159
Indians, including many noted renegades while the troops
had only killed and captured 120, including none of note, in"'
stead of 186 as reported by the general. 138
Kautz now evidently decided he could not usurp the
agent's authority directly. He therefore informed his superiors that they treated him unfairly in expecting him to pursue and punish recalcitrants when he had neither means of
gaining information regarding conditions at the reserve,
nor troops present to exercise control when needed. 139 In
April he requested them to authorize the stationing of an
officer at San Carlos to watch the movements of the Indians
and to inspect their supplies. 140 Political influence was
doubtless brought into play, for on April 28 the secretary of
the interior requested that such officers be stationed at the
agencies in general. 141
136. Comm. to Clum, April .9, 1877, L. B. no. 136, po, 56.
137. Vandever to Comm., May 31, 1877, I. F., 1646.
138. Clum to Editor, June 11, 1877, in Arizona Citizen, June 23, 1877; Clum at
Vandever's request, had already written an official letter covering the same subjects.
Clum to Vandever, May 24, 1877, I. F., 1660.
139. Kautz to A. G., Feb. 12, 1877, op. cit.
140. Kautz to A. G., April 9; 1877, A. G. 0., 2304.
141. Secty. of Int. to Secty. of War, April 28, 1877, I. D., L. B. no. 18, p. 154.
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When Clum returned from Hot Springs with the Southern Apaches, he was greatly incensed to find that an officer
with an escort had already arrived for inspection duty..Feeling that he lacked the "pledged" support of the commissioner, and that his success in removal "had actually been
penalized," he decided to quit rather than become a party to
political schemes which he believed would be certain to
result in confusion and disaster. 142 He therefore asked to be
relieved· at once unless the commissioner would allow him
more pay and two extra companies of police, in which case he
agreed to control all the Apaches in Arizona without military aid. 143
The officials of the Indian Office were naturally unprepared for such a radical proposal aI\d they peremptorily
refused to accept it. Clum, equally inflexible, and. always
headstrong and self-righteous, was never more certain of his
ground than· now. Determined not to. yield an iota to his
superiors, he at last made good his threat of resignation. On
July 1 he regretfully rode away from San Carlos and the bewildered Apaches.144
142. CIum. The Truth About the Apaches. pp..34 et seq;. CIum, "Geronimo," 10".
cit., P. 124.
At the time, Clum was not so philosophical, merely saying that· military inspection
Uto insure purity and justice" ,was an "insult.to the' honor, integrity and· manh~od of
an agent." Clum to Smith, June 6, 1877. I. 0 .• S 606.
143. Clum to Smith, June 9. 1877, I. 0., S 626.
144. Smith to Clum, June 9, 1877; L. B. no. 186. p. 809; Clum to Comm.• June 19.
1877, I. 0., S 667; Schurz to Comm., Aug. 16, 1877, I. 0 .• I 683.
CIum's resignation had already been accepted pending the appointment of a suc·
cessor.. Schurz to Comm., April 18, 1877, I. 0 .• I 888.
'
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